Pareto Distribution of Income in Neoclassical Growth Models

Makoto Nirei

Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University, 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8603, Japan.

Shuhei Aoki

Faculty of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8603, Japan.

Abstract

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of heterogeneous households with production, which accounts for the Pareto distributions of income and wealth. The Pareto distribution is obtained when households face idiosyncratic investment shocks on household assets and are subject to borrowing constraints. The model can quantitatively account for the observed income distribution in the U.S. under reasonable calibrations. In this model, labor income shocks account for the low and middle parts of the distribution, while investment shocks mainly affect the upper tail. We analytically show that the wealth concentration is determined by the balance between the capital income accruing to the premium for the investment shocks and the savings from labor income. Numerical comparative statics show that the wealth concentration increases under high investment risk, low capital tax rate, low labor risk, loose borrowing constraint, or high growth.

Keywords: income distribution; wealth distribution; Pareto exponent; idiosyncratic investment risk; borrowing constraint

JEL codes: D31, O40

Email address: nirei@iir.hit-u.ac.jp (Makoto Nirei)
1. Introduction

The issue of national income and wealth distribution has become a prominent subject of both scholarly inquiry and public discussion. Scholars investigating this topic, such as Piketty and Saez [45], have been particularly concerned with understanding the share of wealth held by the wealthiest individuals in the economy. It has been commonly observed that the income and wealth of this segment follow Pareto distributions. An important property of Pareto distributions is that they have a fat tail. In the real world, this means that the wealthiest one percent of population possesses a substantially larger portion of the national income and wealth than would be predicted by extrapolating the distribution of middle income earners. Accordingly, greater understanding of the overall concentration of income and wealth requires increased attention be paid to why the distributions of top earners universally follow the Pareto distribution.

The purpose of this paper is to construct a standard workhorse macroeconomic model that accounts for the observed Pareto distribution. It is important to analyze income distribution in a general equilibrium model, because many variables that influence the distribution, such as wage rates, capital returns, or aggregate capital level, are endogenously determined, as emphasized by Jones [28]. Using a general equilibrium model, we identify the set of exogenous parameters that affect the Pareto distributions of income and wealth.

Based on the model, we provide three important findings. First, we obtain a closed-form formula for the Pareto exponent, the parameter that determines the concentration of top income and wealth in the Pareto distribution, by assuming a Solow-type consumption function. The formula summarizes our main argument that the Pareto exponent is determined by two opposing forces: investment risk that diffuses the wealth across households within the high wealth group, and the influx of households at the lower end
of the high wealth group. Second, we show that the results obtained with the Solow-type consumption function continue to hold in the standard Bewley model where households optimally solve their intertemporal consumption problem. We show quantitatively that the Bewley model can account for the observed income distribution in the U.S. under reasonably calibrated parameter values. The model can account for detailed distribution characteristics such as the Pareto exponent, the quintiles of income distribution, and the Gini coefficient. Finally, we conduct comparative statics to investigate how the Pareto exponent is affected by various parameters such as idiosyncratic investment and labor shock volatility, tax rates, borrowing constraints, and the exogenous growth rate.

Three elements are required for the Bewley model to generate a Pareto distribution: (i) CRRA preferences, (ii) investment risk, and (iii) either a borrowing constraint or the stochastic end of household lineages. CRRA preferences lead to an asymptotically constant marginal propensity to consume from wealth and an asymptotically constant level of portfolio risk as wealth becomes large. Investment risk combined with a linear savings function constitutes a multiplicative shock in the wealth accumulation process, leading to the diffusion effect that generates the fat-tailed distribution. It is well known that a stochastic process with a multiplicative shock generates a fat-tailed distribution, but diverges indefinitely in the absence of an influx effect. The presence of the borrowing constraint or stochastic death induces a net influx of households into the high wealth group from below, which prevents the wealth distribution from diverging. Consideration of the diffusion and influx effects enables us to interpret our comparative statics results obtained through numerical analysis of the Bewley model. In particular, we obtain that a stricter borrowing constraint reduces wealth concentration through an increased influx effect, whereas an increase in the top marginal tax rate reduces wealth concentration through both a diminished diffusion effect and an augmented influx effect.
We derive our results by combining the literature on Bewley models with insights from research on multiplicative idiosyncratic shocks and Pareto distributions. Idiosyncratic investment shocks and an influx into the high wealth group from below, the two elements that generate the Pareto distribution as discussed above, fit naturally into the standard Bewley model. Following Quadrini [46] and Cagetti and De Nardi [11] in spirit, and adopting the modeling strategy of Covas [17], Angeletos [3], and Panousi [43], we construct an entrepreneurial economy, wherein households engage in “backyard” production. In each period, each household bears income risk by investing physical capital in its own firm. Under CRRA preferences, the fraction of the risky asset in the household portfolio is asymptotically constant among wealthy households. Thus, the distribution of the wealth growth rate becomes independent of the wealth level—i.e., Gibrat’s law applies for the wealthy group. Hence, the wealth accumulation of the wealthy households follows a multiplicative process that is driven by investment risks.

The multiplicative process generates the Pareto distribution, once it is combined with the stochastic end of households (Wold and Whittle [55]; Reed [49]; Benhabib et al. [9]; Toda [54]). We note that the savings of households in the low and middle wealth groups also work as an influx effect that prevents the multiplicative process from diverging. As shown by Carroll and Kimball [13] and the papers cited therein, a household’s consumption function is generically concave if the household with CRRA preferences faces a borrowing constraint or labor income shocks. We feature such households in a Bewley model and show that the precautionary savings induced by the borrowing constraint constitute an influx effect. The idea of the influx effect for generating a power-law distribution is formulated by Kesten [31] and used by Gabaix [22]. Nirei and Souma [42] apply this mechanism to the processes of income and wealth and argue that rate-of-return shocks generate the Pareto distribution, while additive shocks in labor income generate
exponential decay in the low and middle incomes. This paper extends their result by incorporating idiosyncratic investment shocks and earning shocks in the Bewley model, and obtains new testable implications, such as that a strict borrowing constraint or greater risk in labor income increases the Pareto exponent.

In our model, investment shocks mainly affect the top part of the income distribution, while the low and middle parts of the distribution are shaped mostly by labor income shocks, as in the previous Bewley models of income distribution. While the previous studies are successful in accounting for the distribution of low and middle incomes, they do not fully explain the distribution in the upper tail (Aiyagari [1]; Huggett [27]; Quadrini and Ríos-Rull [48]; Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull [14, 15]; Panousi [43]). The Pareto distributions of income and wealth have been traditionally explained by using multiplicative idiosyncratic shocks in partial equilibrium models that abstract from production, as in the classic work of Champernowne [16]. To prevent the multiplicative idiosyncratic shocks from diverging in the optimizing household framework, the overlapping generations setup has been used. Wold and Whittle [55] and Dutta and Michel [18] show that the discontinuities of households stemming from death, combined with shocks to wealth or income, create the Pareto distribution. Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu [8, 9] embed this mechanism into standard models wherein households solve intertemporal decision problems. Our study differs from theirs by including production sectors and borrowing constraints, and thus expanding the identified set of parameters that affect the tail distributions. It came to our attention that Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu [10] recently derive a Pareto distribution in a Bewley model. The paper establishes an asymptotically linear savings function under CRRA and applies a generalized version of the Kesten processes that are used in Nirei and Souma [42]. The present paper differs from theirs in exploring the general equilibrium implications of the Bewley model. In particular,
we find that labor earnings play an important role in the tail distribution, contrary to their claim. This paper examines the impacts on tail distributions of various parameters such as borrowing limits, tax rates, exogenous growth rate, and shock volatilities, going beyond the working paper version (Nirei [41]).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. To develop the intuition underlying the Pareto distribution, Section 2 introduces a basic version of the model wherein households choose consumption and investment following a Solow-type consumption function. We analytically show that the combination of idiosyncratic investment shocks and the lower bound for households wealth generates a Pareto distribution in the upper tail of the wealth and income distributions. Section 3 provides a more elaborate Bewley model wherein households optimally choose consumption and investment. In Section 4, we show that our model, with the borrowing constraint for households and idiosyncratic investment and labor income shocks, can account for the observed properties in the top as well as the remaining parts of the income distribution. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2. Analytical results in a simple model

2.1. Solow model with idiosyncratic investment risk

In this section, we present a Solow growth model with heterogeneous households who face uninsurable idiosyncratic investment risk. Here, we assume a fixed savings rate and i.i.d. productivity and labor shocks. At the expense of these assumptions, the Solow model is analytically tractable for deriving the Pareto exponent. These assumptions are relaxed in Section 3 where we study the Bewley model, wherein the savings rate is optimally chosen by households. With the Bewley model, we will argue that the Pareto exponent is affected by factors such as a borrowing constraint and a marginal tax rate as well as the volatilities of productivity and labor shocks. How those factors affect the
Pareto exponent will be explained by using the analytical results obtained in the Solow model.

Consider a continuum of infinitely-living households \( i \in [0, 1] \). Household \( i \) is endowed with initial capital \( k_{i,0} \), and a “backyard” production technology that is specified by a Cobb-Douglas production function:

\[
y_{i,t} = k_{i,t}^\alpha (a_{i,t}l_{i,t})^{1-\alpha},
\]

where \( l_{i,t} \) is the labor employed by \( i \) and \( k_{i,t} \) is the detrended capital owned by \( i \). The labor-augmenting productivity of the production function \( \tilde{a}_{i,t} \) has a common trend \( \gamma > 1 \):

\[
\tilde{a}_{i,t} = \gamma t a_{i,t},
\]

where \( a_{i,t} \) is an i.i.d. productivity shock. Because of the common productivity growth \( \gamma \), other variables such as output, consumption, capital, bond holding, and the real wage will grow, on an average, at \( \gamma \) along the balanced growth path. Thus, we employ the notation wherein these variables are detrended by \( \gamma t \).

In each period, a household maximizes its profit from physical capital, \( \pi_{i,t} = y_{i,t} - w_t l_{i,t} \), subject to the production function (1). Labor can be hired at wage \( w_t \) after the realization of \( a_{i,t} \). From the profit maximization conditions, we obtain the goods supply function:

\[
y_{i,t} = ((1-\alpha)a_{i,t}/w_t)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha} k_{i,t}.
\]

Then, we obtain \( \pi_{i,t} = \alpha y_{i,t} \) and \( w_t l_{i,t} = (1-\alpha)y_{i,t} \). Detrended aggregate output and capital are denoted as \( Y_t \equiv \int_0^1 y_{i,t}di \) and \( K_t \equiv \int_0^1 k_{i,t}di \), respectively. The labor share of income is constant:

\[
w_t/Y_t = 1 - \alpha.
\]

Substituting into (3) and integrating, we obtain an aggregate relation:

\[
Y_t = AK_t^\alpha,
\]
where

\[ A \equiv \left( E \left( a_{i,t}^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha} \right) \right)^\alpha. \]  

(6)

Households inelastically supply labor \( e_{i,t} \), which is an i.i.d. random variable over \( i \) and \( t \). The savings rate is exogenously fixed at \( s \). There is no capital market in this model.

The capital of household \( i \), detrended by \( \gamma_t \), accumulates as follows:

\[ \gamma k_{i,t+1} = (1 - \delta) k_{i,t} + s(\pi_{i,t} + w_t e_{i,t}) \]  

(7)

where \( \pi_{i,t} \) is the stochastic profit from production and \( \pi_{i,t} + w_t e_{i,t} \) is the income of household \( i \).

The mean labor endowment \( E(e_{i,t}) \) is normalized to 1. Thus, aggregate labor supply is \( \int_0^1 e_{i,t} di = 1 \). By aggregating the capital accumulation equation (7) across households, and by using (5), we reproduce the equation of motion for aggregate capital in the Solow model,

\[ \gamma K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) K_t + s A K_t^\alpha, \]  

(8)

where \( K_t \) is detrended by \( \gamma_t \). Equation (8) shows that \( K_t \) follows deterministic dynamics with steady state \( \bar{K} \), which is stable and uniquely solved in the domain \( K > 0 \) as

\[ \bar{K} = \left( \frac{s A}{\gamma - 1 + \delta} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)}. \]  

(9)

Thus, the model preserves the standard implications of the Solow model on the aggregate characteristics of the balanced growth path. The long-run output-capital ratio \( Y/K \) is equal to \( (\gamma - 1 + \delta)/s \). The golden-rule savings rate is equal to \( \alpha \).

2.2. Deriving the Pareto distribution

Equations (2,3,4,5,7,8) and \( \pi_{i,t} = \alpha y_{i,t} \) define the dynamics of \( (k_{i,t}, K_t) \). As is shown above, \( K_t \) deterministically converges to \( \bar{K} \). At \( \bar{K} \), the dynamics of individual capital \( k_{i,t} \)
follows

\[ k_{i,t+1} = g_{i,t} k_{i,t} + z e_{i,t}, \]  

(10)

where

\[ g_{i,t} \equiv \frac{1 - \delta}{\gamma} + \frac{\alpha s}{\gamma} \left( \frac{a_{i,t}}{AK^\alpha} \right)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}, \]  

(11)

\[ z \equiv \frac{(1 - \alpha) sAK^\alpha}{\gamma}. \]  

(12)

The additive term \( z e_{i,t} \) is the savings from detrended labor income, \( s w_{i,t} e_{i,t}/\gamma \), and strictly positive. The multiplicative term \( g_{i,t} \) is the return to detrended capital \((1 - \delta + s \pi_{i,t}/k_{i,t})/\gamma\).

The stochastic process (10) is stationary because \( \text{E}(g_{i,t}) = \alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \delta)/\gamma < 1 \) holds from (11).

Equation (10) is called a Kesten process, which is a stochastic process with a multiplicative shock and an additive positive shock. It is known that a Kesten process has a stationary distribution with a power-law tail. Hence, we obtain the following proposition.

**Proposition 1.** If the probability for \( g_{i,t} > 1 \) is strictly positive, the household’s detrended capital \( k_{i,t} \) has a stationary distribution whose tail follows a Pareto distribution:

\[ \Pr(k_{i,t} > k) \propto k^{-\lambda}, \]  

(13)

where the Pareto exponent \( \lambda \) is determined by the condition

\[ \text{E}(g_{i,t}^\lambda) = 1. \]  

(14)

The power-law tail distribution (13) and the condition for \( \lambda \) (14) are obtained by the theorem shown by Kesten [31] (see also Levy and Solomon [34] and Gabaix [22]). Because capital income \( \pi_{i,t} \) is proportional to \( k_{i,t} \), the household’s income \( \pi_{i,t} + w_{i,t} e_{i,t} \) follows the same tail distribution as \( k_{i,t} \), if \( e_{i,t} \) has a thin tail bounded by \( e_{i,t}^{\lambda-1} \). Note that the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Top 1% income share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Top 1% income shares and \(0.01^{1-1/\lambda}\) evaluated at Pareto exponent \(\lambda\) estimated with historical U.S. income distributions. Source for shares and \(\lambda\) is the World Top Incomes Database [2].

Proposition 1 shows that idiosyncratic investment shocks generate a “top heavy” distribution. The Pareto distribution is top heavy in that a sizable fraction of the total income is possessed by the richest few. Under the Pareto distribution with \(\lambda > 1\), the richest \(P\) fraction of the population owns fraction \(P^{1-1/\lambda}\) of the total income (Newman [38]). This formula applies only when the entire distribution follows a Pareto distribution, whereas in empirical income distributions only the right tail above the 99th percentile is fitted well by a Pareto distribution. Nonetheless, estimates of historical Pareto exponents match well with historical top income shares through this formula, as can be seen in Figure 1. This agreement suggests that factors that determine the Pareto exponent may explain the shifts in top income shares.
2.3. Determination of the Pareto exponent and comparative statics

We further characterize \( \lambda \) by assuming that the productivity shock \( a_{i,t} \) follows a log-normal distribution with mean 1. Let \( \sigma^2 \) denote the variance of \( \log a_{i,t} \). Thus, \( \text{E}(a_{i,t}) = 1 \) implies \( \text{E}(\log a_{i,t}) = -\sigma^2/2 \). We first show that \( \lambda \) is decreasing in \( \sigma \) and bounded below by 1.

**Proposition 2.** *The Pareto exponent \( \lambda \) is uniquely determined by Equation (14) for any \( \sigma \). The Pareto exponent always satisfies \( \lambda > 1 \) and the stationary distribution has a finite mean. Moreover, \( \lambda \) is decreasing in \( \sigma \).*

The proofs for the propositions in this section are deferred to Appendix A. Proposition 2 provides a comparative static of \( \lambda \) with respect to \( \sigma \). In the proof, we show that \( \text{E}(g_{i,t}^{\lambda}) \) is strictly increasing in \( \lambda \). Establishing this is easy when \( \delta = 1 \), since \( g_{i,t} \) then follows a two-parameter log-normal distribution. Under 100% depreciation, we obtain a closed-form solution for \( \lambda \) as follows.

**Proposition 3.** *If \( \delta = 1 \), the Pareto exponent is explicitly determined as

\[
\lambda = 1 - \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \right)^2 \log \frac{\alpha}{\sigma^2/2}.
\]

(15)

This expression captures the essential result that \( \lambda \) is greater than 1 and decreasing in \( \sigma \). Proposition 2 establishes this property in a more realistic case of partial depreciation under which \( g_{i,t} \) follows a shifted log-normal distribution. Proposition 3 also implies that \( \lambda \) is increasing in capital share \( \alpha \). Intuitively speaking, this is because a small capital share enhances the effect of productivity shocks on the returns to capital.

Proposition 2 shows that the “top heavy” distribution generated by the Solow economy has a certain limit in the wealth inequality, since the stationary Pareto exponent cannot be smaller than 1. As we discussed previously, the share of the total wealth owned
by the wealthiest $P$ fraction is $P^{1-1/\lambda}$ for $\lambda > 1$. For example, if $\lambda = 2$, this implies that the top 1 percent owns 10% of total wealth. If $\lambda < 1$, the wealth share possessed by the rich converges to 1 as the population grows to infinity. Namely, virtually all of the wealth belongs to the richest few. Further, when $\lambda < 1$, the expected ratio of the single richest person’s wealth to the economy’s total wealth converges to $1 - \lambda$ (Feller [20, p.172]). Proposition 2 shows that the Solow economy does not allow such an extreme concentration of wealth, because $\lambda$ cannot be smaller than 1 at the stationary state.

The Pareto distribution has a finite mean only if $\lambda > 1$ and a finite variance only if $\lambda > 2$. When $\lambda$ is found in the range between 1 and 2, the capital distribution has a finite mean but an infinite variance. The infinite variance implies that in an economy with finite households, the population variance grows unboundedly as the population size increases. Empirical income distributions indicate that the Pareto exponent historically transits below and above 2, in the range between 1.5 and 3.\(^1\) This implies that the economy goes back and forth between the two regimes, one with finite variance of income ($\lambda > 2$) and one with infinite variance ($\lambda \leq 2$). The two regimes differ not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, since for $\lambda < 2$, almost the entire sum of the variances of idiosyncratic risks is borne by the wealthiest few, whereas the risks are more evenly distributed for $\lambda > 2$. This can be seen as follows. In our model, the households do not diversify investment risks. Thus, their income variance increases with the square of their wealth $k_{i,t}^2$, which has a Pareto tail with exponent $\lambda/2$. Thus, given $\lambda < 2$, the income variance is distributed as a Pareto distribution with exponent less than 1, which is so unequal that the single wealthiest household bears a fraction $1 - \lambda/2$ of the sum of the variances of the idiosyncratic risks across households, and virtually the entire sum of the variances is

\(^1\)See, for example, Alvaredo et al. [2], Fujiwara et al. [21], and Souma [52].
borne by the richest few percentiles. Thus, in this model, the concentration of wealth can be interpreted as the result of the concentration of risk bearings in terms of the variance of income.

An analytical solution is obtained for the important special case where $\lambda = 2$ as follows. Proposition 4. The Pareto exponent $\lambda$ is greater than (less than) 2 when $\sigma < \hat{\sigma}$ ($> \hat{\sigma}$) where

$$\hat{\sigma}^2 = \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\right)^2 \log \left(\frac{1}{\alpha^2} \left(1 + \frac{2(1-\alpha)}{\gamma/(1-\delta) - 1}\right)\right).$$

(16)

Moreover, $\lambda$ is decreasing in $\gamma$ and $\delta$ in the neighborhood of $\sigma = \hat{\sigma}$.

Proposition 4 relates the Pareto exponent $\lambda$ with the productivity shock variance $\sigma^2$, the growth rate $\gamma$, and the depreciation rate $\delta$. The Pareto exponent is smaller when the variance is larger. Both $\gamma$ and $\delta$ negatively affect $\lambda$ around $\lambda = 2$. That is, faster growth or faster wealth depreciation increases inequality in the tail if $\lambda$ is around 2.

Proposition 4 determines the magnitude of risk that generates the Pareto exponent $\lambda = 2$. The risk magnitude is intuitively derived as follows. At $\lambda = 2$, the condition for determining the Pareto exponent (14) must hold as $E(g_{i,t}^2) = 1$. Using $E(g_{i,t}) = 1 - z/\bar{K}$, this leads to $\text{Var}(g_{i,t})/2 = z/\bar{K} - (z/\bar{K})^2/2$. The key variable $z/\bar{K}$ is equal to $(1-\alpha)(1-(1-\delta)/\gamma)$ as can be derived from (12) at the steady state. Under the benchmark parameters $\alpha = 0.36$, $\delta = 0.1$, and $\gamma = 1.02$, we obtain $z/\bar{K}$ to be around 0.08. We can thus neglect the second-order term $(z/\bar{K})^2$ and obtain $z/\bar{K} \approx \text{Var}(g_{i,t})/2$ as the condition for $\lambda = 2$. This implies that $\lambda = 2$ holds when the standard deviation of $g$ is about 0.4 under the calibration above. The ratio of the two contributions, $(z/\bar{K})/(\text{Var}(g_{i,t})/2)$, is inversely related to $1-(1-\delta)/\gamma$, as can be derived from (11,12) at the steady state. Thus, while it is difficult to obtain a reliable estimate for entrepreneurial risks, this value seems not unreasonable. For example, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen [37] cite the annual standard deviation of
both growth $\gamma$ and depreciation $\delta$ enhance wealth accumulation more through risk-taking income than through labor income. This mechanism explains the comparative statics in Proposition 4.

When $a_{i,t}$ follows a log-normal distribution, $g$ is approximated in the first order by a log-normal distribution around the mean of $a_{i,t}$. We explore the formula for $\lambda$ under the first-order approximation. From (14), we obtain $\lambda \approx -E(\log g)/(\text{Var}(\log g)/2)$. This indicates that $\lambda$ is determined by the relative importance of the drift and diffusion of capital growth rates, both of which contribute to the overall growth rate. Using $E(g) = 1 - z/\bar{K}$, we obtain an alternative expression $\lambda \approx 1 - \frac{\log(1 - z/\bar{K})}{\text{Var}(\log g)/2}$ as in Gabaix [22]. We observe that the Pareto exponent $\lambda$ is always greater than 1, and it declines to 1 as savings $z/\bar{K}$ decreases to 0 or the diffusion effect $\text{Var}(\log g)$ increases to infinity. For a small $z/\bar{K}$, the expression is further approximated as

$$\lambda \approx 1 + \frac{z/\bar{K}}{\text{Var}(\log g)/2}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

Equation (17) demonstrates that the Pareto exponent is determined by the balance between two forces: the contributions of an additive term ($z/\bar{K}$) and a diffusion term ($\text{Var}(\log g)/2$) of the Kesten process (10). These two forces are depicted in Figure 2. The additive term constitutes the wealth accumulation contributed from labor income. This term determines the mass of households who enter the lower end of the high wealth group from the low and middle groups. We call this an influx effect. The diffusion term constitutes the wealth accumulation contributed from capital income due to risk taking. This is seen by noting that $\text{Var}(\log g)/2$ is the contribution of diffusion to the mean total return $\log E(g)$.

returns for the smallest decile of public firm in the period 1953–1999, 41.4%, in order to find the lower bound of the risk faced by entrepreneurs.
Figure 2: Determination of the Pareto exponent $\lambda$. The influx of wealth through savings from labor raises $\lambda$, while the diffusion of wealth caused by investment risk lowers $\lambda$.

Our analysis of the Solow model showed that the Pareto exponent is determined as 2 when the influx effect balances with the diffusion effect. In other words, the stationary distribution of income exhibits a finite or infinite variance depending on whether the contribution of labor to capital accumulation exceeds or falls short of the contribution of risk taking. The simple Solow model allows extension in various ways. In Appendix B, we analyze the effect of redistribution and risk sharing on the Pareto exponent in an extended Solow model.

3. The Bewley model

3.1. Bewley model with idiosyncratic investment shocks

In reality, household saving behavior depends on the wealth level, tax rate, and risk environment, and it has important implications on the Pareto exponent. In order to
incorporate the households’ optimal savings choice, we depart from the Solow model and develop a Bewley model with idiosyncratic investment shocks and borrowing constraints. The model specification is largely unchanged from Section 2, except for the formulation of the household’s dynamic optimization and serially correlated exogenous shocks on productivity and employment hours.

Household $i$ inelastically supplies $e_{i,t}$ units of labor, which follows an exogenous autoregressive process: $e_{i,t} = 1 - \zeta + \zeta e_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{i,t}$. The unconditional mean of individual labor supply, and thus the aggregate labor supply at the steady state, is normalized to 1. The households’ production function bears an idiosyncratic productivity shock, $a_{i,t}$, which follows a two-state Markov process. The households have no means to insure against idiosyncratic shocks $a_{i,t}$ and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ except for their own savings.

Household $i$ can hold assets in the form of physical capital $k_{i,t}$ and bonds $b_{i,t}$. At the optimal labor hiring $l_{i,t}$, the return to physical capital is defined as

$$r_{i,t} \equiv \frac{\pi_{i,t}}{k_{i,t}} + 1 - \delta = \alpha(1-\alpha)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}(a_{i,t}/w_t)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha} + 1 - \delta. \quad (18)$$

The bond bears risk-free interest $R_t$. The households can engage in lending and borrowing through bonds, but the borrowing amount (detrended) must not exceed the borrowing limit $\phi$, that is, $b_{i,t+1} > -\phi$.

Each household lineage is discontinued with a small probability $\mu$ in each period. In this event, a new household is formed at the same index $i$ with no wealth. Following the perpetual youth model, we assume that the households participate in a pension program. The households contract all the non-human wealth to be confiscated by the pension program at the discontinuation of the lineage, and they receive in return a premium at rate $p$ per unit of wealth they own in each period of continued lineage. The pension program is a pure redistribution system, and must satisfy the zero-profit condition $(1 - \mu)p = \mu$. 16
Thus, the pension premium rate is determined as
\[ p = \mu / (1 - \mu). \] (19)

We incorporate progressive income taxation using a variation of Bénabou’s [7] specification. The net tax payment is a function of household income \( I_{i,t} \equiv (r_{i,t} - 1)k_{i,t} + (R - 1)b_{i,t} + w_t e_{i,t} \) as follows:
\[
T_{i,t} = \begin{cases} 
I_{i,t} - \tau_0 I_{i,t}^{1-\tau_1} & \text{if } I_{i,t} < I^* \\
I^* - \tau_0 I^*^{1-\tau_1} + \tau_2 (I_{i,t} - I^*) & \text{if } I_{i,t} \geq I^*.
\end{cases}
\] (20)

The first convex part and the second linear part smoothly join at \( I^* \equiv (\tau_0 (1 - \tau_1) / (1 - \tau_2))^{1/\tau_1} \) with derivative \( \tau_2 \), which denotes the highest marginal tax rate applied to the highest income bracket. We assume that the tax proceeds are spent on unproductive government purchase of goods.

Given the optimal operation of physical capital in each period, the households solve the following dynamic programming problem:
\[
V(W, a, e) = \max_{c,k',b',\theta'} c^{1-\rho} / (1 - \rho) + \tilde{\beta} \mathbb{E} (V(W', a', e') | a, e)
\] (21)

subject to \( c, k' \geq 0 \) and
\[
c + \gamma (k' + b' + \phi) = W,
\] (22)
\[
W = (1 + p) (rk + Rb + we - T) + \gamma \phi,
\] (23)
\[
b' + \phi > 0,
\] (24)
where \( \tilde{\beta} \) is a modified discount factor \( \tilde{\beta} \equiv \beta \gamma^{1-\rho} (1 - \mu) \). \( W_{i,t} \) denotes the total resources available to \( i \) at \( t \) (the cash-at-hand). The control variables \( k_i \) and \( b_i \) can be equivalently expressed by \( i \)’s total financial assets \( x_i \equiv k_i + b_i + \phi \) and portfolio \( \theta_i \equiv k_i / x_i \). Thus, the household solves the optimal savings problem for \( x_i \) and the portfolio choice for \( \theta_i \).
An equilibrium is defined as a value function $V$, policy functions $(x, \theta)$, price functions $(w, R)$, a joint distribution function $\Lambda$, and the law of motion $\Gamma$ for $\Lambda$ such that $V(W_i, a_i, e_i; \Lambda)$, $x(W_i, a_i, e_i; \Lambda)$, and $\theta(W_i, a_i, e_i; \Lambda)$ solve the household’s dynamic programming problem, such that prices $w(\Lambda)$ and $R(\Lambda)$ clear the markets for goods, labor $\int_0^1 l_{i,t}di = \int_0^1 e_{i,t}di = 1$, and bonds $\int_0^1 b_{i,t}di = 0$, and such that the policy functions and the exogenous Markov processes of $a_i$ and $e_i$ constitute $\Gamma$, which maps the joint distribution of $\Lambda(W_i, a_i, e_i)$ to that in the next period. A stationary equilibrium is defined as a particular equilibrium, wherein $\Lambda$ is a fixed point of $\Gamma$.

We argue that the stationary wealth distribution in the Bewley economy with a sufficiently large rate-of-return shock and with CRRA preferences generically has a power-law tail. There is one notable exception in which the borrowing limit $\phi$ is not binding, the labor shock $e_{i,t}$ is degenerate, and $\mu = 0$. In this particular case, the stationary distribution does not exist, as we show in the next section. Otherwise, the stationary distribution exists, and the rate-of-return shock leads to the Pareto distribution. This can be seen as follows. Households with CRRA preferences hold a constant portfolio of risky and risk-less assets asymptotically as their wealth increases (see Carroll and Kimball [13]; Benhabib et al. [10]). Thus, their total resources $W_{i,t}$ incur a multiplicative shock $g_{i,t}$. In this case, if the total resources $W_{i,t}$ (detrended) has a stationary distribution, the stationary distribution must satisfy $\Pr(W_{i,t+1} > w) = \Pr(W_{i,t} > w/g_{i,t})$ for large $w$ in the case of i.i.d. shocks, as argued in Gabaix [22]. This equation is solved by a Pareto distribution with exponent $\lambda$ satisfying $E(g_{i,t}^{\lambda}) = 1$, if the condition $\Pr(g_{i,t} > 1) > 0$ is satisfied. The existence of the stationary distribution is warranted either by $\mu > 0$ or a binding borrowing constraint. The former case is discussed in the next section. The latter case is related to the recent finding by Kamihigashi and Stachurski [30] on the existence of a stationary distribution for Markov processes. They establish the existence even when the domain
is not compact. Their existence condition requires that the steady-state transition function of household total resources $W_{i,t}$ in our model satisfy that the stochastic kernel is increasing, order-reversing, bounded in probability and has a deficient distribution. As Aiyagari [1] showed, solvency constraints require that households’ debt is limited by a natural borrowing limit $w e_{\text{min}}/(R - 1)$ if there is a non-degenerate labor shock. With this borrowing limit, the detrended total resources are bounded in probability and have a deficient distribution. The order-reversing condition is satisfied in the setup studied in Section 4, where households with high productivity always choose to invest fully in physical capital.

3.2. Tractable case without borrowing constraints

The Bewley model is analytically tractable when the borrowing constraint and the labor shock are absent. In this section, we show that wealth follows a log-normal process if $\mu = 0$ in this case. This log-normal process implies that no stationary distribution of relative wealth exists. When $\mu > 0$, the stationary distribution of wealth is shown to have a Pareto tail, and the Pareto exponent is analytically derived.

We concentrate on a special case with no tax (i.e., $T_{i,t} = 0$), constant labor supply $e_{i,t} = 1$, and i.i.d. productivity $a_{i,t}$ over $i$ and $t$. Because of the i.i.d. shocks, we have the aggregate production relation (5) as in the Solow model. Since this model features utility exhibiting constant relative risk aversion, the savings rate and portfolio decisions are independent of wealth levels if there is no limit on borrowing (Samuelson [51]; Merton [36]). Here, we draw on Angeletos’ [3] analysis. Let $H_t$ denote human wealth, defined as the present value of future wage income stream, $H_t \equiv \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \gamma^\tau w_{\tau}(1 - \mu)^{\tau - t} \prod_{s=t+1}^{\tau} R_s^{-1}$, where wage $w_{\tau}$ is detrended by the growth factor $\gamma$. Define detrended human wealth $H_t = \tilde{H}_t/\gamma^t$. Then, the evolution of human wealth satisfies $H_t = w_t + (1 - \mu)\gamma R_{t+1}^{-1}H_{t+1}$. We define a household’s total wealth (detrended) as $W_{i,t} = (1 + p)(r_{i,t}k_{i,t} + R_{t}b_{i,t}) + H_t$. 

Consider a balanced growth path at which $R_t$, $w_t$, and $H_t$ are constant over time. In this case, the dynamic programming problem allows a linear solution with constants $s$ and $\theta$ as $c = (1 - s)W$, $k' = \theta sW/\gamma$, and $b' = (1 - \theta)sW/\gamma - (1 - \mu)R^{-1}H$.

By substituting the policy functions into the definition of wealth, and by noting that $(1 - \mu)(1 + p) = 1$ holds from the zero-profit condition for the pension program (19), we obtain the equation of motion for the detrended individual total wealth:

$$W_{i,t+1} = \begin{cases} \tilde{g}_{i,t+1}W_{i,t} & \text{with prob. } 1 - \mu \\ H & \text{with prob. } \mu, \end{cases}$$

where the growth rate is defined as

$$\tilde{g}_{i,t} = \frac{(\theta r_i + (1 - \theta)R)s}{(1 - \mu)\gamma}.$$ (26)

Thus, at the balanced growth path, household wealth evolves multiplicatively according to (25) as long as the household lineage is continued. When the lineage is discontinued, a new household with initial wealth $W_{i,t} = H$ replaces the old one. Therefore, the individual wealth $W_{i,t}$ follows a log-normal process with random reset events where $H$ is the resetting point. Using the result of Manrubia and Zanette [35], the Pareto exponent of the wealth distribution is determined as follows.³

Proposition 5. A household’s detrended total wealth $W_{i,t}$ has a stationary distribution with Pareto exponent $\lambda$, which is determined by

$$(1 - \mu)E(\tilde{g}_{i,t}^\lambda) = 1$$ (27)

if $\mu > 0$. If $\mu = 0$, $W_{i,t}$ has no stationary distribution and asymptotically follows a log-normal distribution with diverging variance.

³We thank Wataru Souma for pointing to this reference. This result can be seen as a discrete-time analogue of the stationary Pareto distribution of a geometric Brownian motion with random life-time, as explained in Reed [49] and applied to the overlapping generations model by Benhabib et al. [9], although the geometric Brownian model differs in that it generates a double Pareto distribution.
Proof: See Appendix C.

We note that if there is no discontinuation event (i.e., \( \mu = 0 \)), individual wealth follows a log-normal process with log-mean and log-variance increasing linearly in \( t \). Therefore, the relative wealth \( W_{i,t}/\int W_{j,t}dj \) does not have a stationary distribution in the case of \( \mu = 0 \) and no binding borrowing constraint. In this case, a vanishingly small fraction of individuals eventually possesses almost all the wealth. However, historical records in the U.S. show otherwise, where the current level of the Pareto exponent is comparable with that in 1920. Unlike the log-normal process, the empirical variance of log-income is stationary in the long run, as Kalecki [29] pointed out in a classic debate with Gibrat. One way to avoid the diverging variance is to introduce \( \mu > 0 \) as seen above. Another way is to introduce borrowing constraints, as we show in the next section.

4. Quantitative investigation of the Pareto exponent

4.1. Bewley model with binding borrowing constraints

In this section, we analyze how the Pareto distribution is affected by fundamental parameters in the general equilibrium model. The key element for the Bewley model to generate the Pareto distribution even when \( \mu = 0 \) is a borrowing constraint. When households face a binding borrowing constraint, the consumption function is concave in wealth, whereas it is linear without borrowing constraints. As Carroll and Kimball [13] emphasize, the linear consumption function arises only in a narrow specification of the Bewley model. For example, a concave consumption function arises when the labor income is uncertain or when the household’s borrowing is constrained. This implies that the log-normal process of wealth is a special case whereas the Pareto distribution characterizes a wide class of model specifications.

Since the Bewley model with a borrowing constraint is difficult to solve analytically,
we numerically solve for a stationary equilibrium. This model features a multiplicative investment shock, in addition to a labor hours shock that enters the wealth accumulation process additively as in Aiyagari [1]. Thus, the stationary wealth distribution has a fat tail unlike the Aiyagari economy.

To manage the computation of portfolio choice, we follow a two-step approach similar to Barillas and Fernández-Villaverde [6], who solve the neoclassical growth model with labor choice using the endogenous gridpoints method used by Carroll [12] for the savings problem and standard value function iteration for the labor choice. The autoregressive process of labor supply $e_{i,t}$ is approximated by a five-state Markov process following the Rouwenhorst method (Kopecky and Suen [33]).

With autocorrelation in productivity $a_{i,t}$, households with high productivity will invest in capital at a high rate of borrowing, while the households with low productivity will shift their assets to risk-free bonds. Thus, this model captures an economy wherein a fraction of the households choose to become entrepreneurs while the other households rely on wages and returns from safe assets as their main income source. Since the entrepreneurs bear the investment shocks that generate the fat tail of wealth distribution in this model, we observe that the tail population largely consists of current and past entrepreneurs. As a model of entrepreneurship, the model presented here is not as rich as the ones with occupational choice (see Quadrini [47] for a survey). Nonetheless, in this model, the entrepreneurs (households with high productivity) do not diversify much of their investment risks while workers choose to bear substantially smaller risks.

We compute the stationary equilibrium distributions of wealth $W_{i,t}$ and income $I_{i,t}$. To calibrate the taxation function, we use the estimate by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante [25], $\tau_1 = 0.151$. We set $\tau_0 = 0.9$ so government expenditure is about 10% of GDP. The highest marginal tax rate is specified as $\tau_2 = 0.5$ to emulate the rate
before the tax cut in 1986 in the U.S. The labor endowment process is calibrated as $\zeta = 0.82$ and \(\text{Std}(\epsilon_{i,t}) = 0.29\), following Guvenen [24]. The transition matrix $\Pi$ for the productivity shock $a_i$ is set by $\pi_{11} = 0.9727$ and $\pi_{22} = 0.8$, for which the stationary fraction of households with high productivity is 12% and the average exit rate from the high productivity group is 20%. These numbers correspond to the fraction and exit rate of entrepreneurs in the U.S. data (Kitao [32]).\(^4\) The states of $a_{i,t}$ are set at $\{0.75, 1.25\}$, which corresponds to a 10% standard deviation in risky asset returns. At this volatility of productivity shocks, the stationary wealth distribution in the model with tax rate $\tau_2 = 0.5$ generates a Pareto exponent of about 2, which roughly matches with the U.S. level right before the tax cut in 1986. The lineage discontinuation rate $\mu$ is set at 2%. The borrowing constraint is set at $\phi = 0.18$, which is worth three months wage income. At this value, the difference in consumption growth rates between low-asset (less than two months labor income) and high-asset groups matches with Zeldes’ estimate, 1.7% (Zeldes [56]; Nirei [39]). The parameters on technology and preferences are set at standard values as $\alpha = 0.36$, $\delta = 0.1$, $\rho = 3$, $\beta = 0.96$, and $\gamma = 1.02$.

The wealth distribution at the stationary equilibrium for this benchmark calibration is computed numerically. Appendix D details the computation method. Table 1 compares income distribution for the benchmark case with income distribution in the U.S. in 1985. As can be seen, the simulated and empirical distributions reasonably resemble each other at the quintiles and at the 95 percentile, as well as in the Gini index and the top one percent shares of income and wealth. Note that the highest marginal income tax rate is set at $\tau_2 = 0.5$ in the benchmark calibration in order to be comparable to the tax

\(^4\)In the model, the low productivity households still hold some capital in backyard production, as a result of imposing the Inada condition. However, the level of the return to capital with low productivity is very close to the risk-free rate. Thus, we interpret those households as non-entrepreneurs.
Table 1: Distribution characteristics in the model and in the U.S. The table lists quintiles of income $I_{i,t}$, 95 percentile income, Gini index of income, and top 1% shares of income and wealth $W_{i,t}$. Percentile income is measured relative to the median income. Sources of the U.S. estimates are the Census for the percentiles and Gini index, Piketty [44] for the top income shares, and Saez and Zucman [50] for the top wealth shares.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>p20</th>
<th>p40</th>
<th>p60</th>
<th>p80</th>
<th>p95</th>
<th>Gini</th>
<th>Top I share</th>
<th>Top W share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>1.276</td>
<td>1.655</td>
<td>3.023</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low tax</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>1.300</td>
<td>1.637</td>
<td>2.934</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US 1985</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>1.227</td>
<td>1.845</td>
<td>3.049</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US 2010</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>1.248</td>
<td>2.030</td>
<td>3.663</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

rate before the tax cut in 1986. The case of a low tax ($\tau_2 = 0.28$) and the empirical distribution in 2010 are also reported in the table. We observe that the wealth share increases significantly in our model with the low tax rate.

In what follows, we conduct comparative statics of the Pareto exponent. We will show that the Pareto exponent decreases (i.e., the tail becomes less equal) under high investment risk, low labor risk, low capital tax rate, loose borrowing constraint, or high growth. We interpret these results by using the scheme depicted in Figure 2: investment risk is categorized as the diffusion effect, while labor risk and borrowing constraint as the influx effect. The tax and technological growth affect both the diffusion and influx effects. We explain them in turn.

4.2. Investment risk: the diffusion effect

Figure 3 shows the stationary wealth distributions under the benchmark calibration, the case with high variance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks $a_{i,t}$, the case with low variance, and the case with no productivity shocks. The plot shows a complementary cu-
Figure 3: Stationary wealth distributions when standard deviation of productivity $\text{Std}(a_{i,t})$ is set at 0.3 (high), 0.25 (benchmark), 0.2 (low), and 0 (no productivity shock).

Cumulative distribution (i.e., a distribution cumulated from above) of the household wealth relative to the median household wealth. Pareto distributions are clearly observed in the right tail of wealth for the top 1% of the distribution (i.e., beneath $10^{-2}$ in the complementary cumulative distribution). The plots demonstrate that the increased investment risk leads to less equal tail distributions, indicated by the flatter tail. Furthermore, the Pareto tail distribution disappears when the variance of the productivity shock is set at 0. This observation confirms our hypothesis that investment risk is necessary for our model to generate the Pareto distribution of wealth.

We interpret the effect of productivity shocks as a diffusion effect. Some diffusion is necessary for the Pareto distribution to emerge, as shown by the case with no investment risk. As the investment risk becomes high, the volatility of the wealth growth rate increases, resulting in a lower Pareto exponent. Note that the higher investment risk can
reduce the capital portfolio due to risk aversion, which mitigates the increased volatility of capital return. However, this mitigating effect is relatively weak under our calibrations.

4.3. Precautionary savings: the influx effect

Figure 4 shows the stationary wealth distributions when the variance of the labor endowment shock (Var(ε_{i,t})) varies. The plots show that the increased variance of the labor endowment shock naturally leads to a less equal distribution in the low and middle wealth region. However, in the tail region, the wealth distribution becomes more equal under the increased variance of the labor shock. We will interpret this as an increased influx effect shortly.

Our benchmark calibration for the labor income process adopts a relatively mild persistence, ζ = 0.82, following Guvenen’s [24] estimates. To see if our results survive
when the labor income process is near unit-root, we conduct a robustness check by setting \( \zeta = 0.97 \) and the variance of \( \epsilon \) at 0.03 following Hryshko [26]. Figure 5 shows the result. As can be seen, the persistent labor income process does not change the Pareto exponent of the stationary wealth distribution from the benchmark case. We also use an upper-bound estimate for the variance of \( \epsilon \), 0.07. The high variance results in a high Pareto exponent, similarly to that in Figure 4. Hence, we find that our results are robust to the persistence of labor income process.

The stationary wealth distribution is affected by other fundamental parameters, such as the death rate \( \mu \), borrowing constraint \( \phi \), and technological growth \( \gamma \), as shown in Figure 6. The plot for \( \mu = 0 \) demonstrates that the Pareto distribution can be generated even when the households are infinitely living. As proven in the previous section, the wealth distribution of infinitely living households follows a log-normal distribution.
Figure 6: Stationary wealth distributions for the cases of infinitely living households ($\mu = 0$), relaxed borrowing limit ($\phi = 0.72$), and high growth ($\gamma = 1.04$), compared to the benchmark ($\mu = 0.02$, $\phi = 0.18$, and $\gamma = 1.02$).

with diverging log-variance if the savings function is linear in wealth. Thus, the binding borrowing constraint plays a key role in generating a stationary Pareto distribution when $\mu = 0$, by inducing precautionary savings. The borrowing constraint also has a quantitatively considerable impact on the Pareto exponent. In Figure 6, the stationary wealth distribution for the case $\phi = 0.72$ is plotted. This value of the borrowing limit corresponds to annual wage income. The plot indicates that relaxing the borrowing constraint from the benchmark three months wage to a year’s wage has roughly the same impact on the Pareto exponent as reducing the death rate from $\mu = 0.02$ to 0.

The low labor risk and loose borrowing constraint affect the influx effect through the precautionary motive of savings. Households have less incentive for precautionary savings when the labor risk is low or the borrowing constraint becomes lax. Hence, the saving
rate among the low and middle wealth groups falls, which reduces the influx of labor income into wealth, leading to a fall in the Pareto exponent. This result contrasts with Benhabib et al. [8] who claimed that labor income risk does not affect the tail. When there is a borrowing limit, our numerical results show that labor risk affects the tail and that the impact is quantitatively considerable.

We note that the influx effect results from the difference in the saving rates between the high wealth group and the others, rather than from the average saving rate. In the Solow model, the savings rate per se does not affect $\lambda$ at the stationary distribution, as shown in Proposition 6 in Appendix B. In the Bewley model, we argue that precautionary savings serve as a reflective lower bound for wealth accumulation. When the borrowing constraint is binding, more volatile labor shocks lead to a higher saving rate among the low and middle wealth groups, while the effect for high wealth households is limited. The differential response of households in the saving rates results in an increased influx effect $z/\bar{K}$. Because stationarity requires $E(g) = 1 - z/\bar{K}$, the increased $z/\bar{K}$ raises the Pareto exponent through the condition $E(g^\lambda) = 1$.\(^5\)

Figure 6 shows that a low death rate ($\mu = 0$) leads to a low Pareto exponent. While this is straightforward given the analysis in Section 3.2, we can interpret the effect of $\mu$ as an influx effect, because the low death rate reduces the net inflow of households from the low and middle wealth groups to the lower end of high wealth group relative to the outflow. Figure 6 also plots the stationary wealth distribution for the case with high growth $\gamma = 1.04$. The plot shows that the higher rate of technological growth makes the

\(^5\)It may be useful to consider a “Cambridge” growth model in which the saving rate from labor income (i.e., $s$ in (11)) differs from that from capital income ($s$ in (12)). Nirei [40] showed that an increase in $s$ in (12) alone causes a relatively quick transition to a flatter Pareto tail. This occurs because the increased savings in (12) alone increases $z$ more than aggregate capital $\bar{K}$. 29
wealth distribution less equal in the right tail. This is consistent with our analytical result in Proposition 4. A high growth rate increases both the influx effect \( z/K \) and the wealth growth \( g \) linearly in \( 1 - (1 - \delta)/\gamma \), as can be derived from (11,12) at the steady state. Since the diffusion effect depends on the variance of \( g \), the diffusion effect overwhelms the influx effect, resulting in the lower Pareto exponent.

4.4. The effect of tax

Figure 7 plots the complementary cumulative distributions of wealth and income at the stationary equilibrium for the cases of a top marginal tax rate \( \tau_2 = 0.5 \) (benchmark) and 0.28. Both wealth and income are normalized by the median household wealth and income, respectively. We observe that the Pareto exponents for wealth and income coincide. That is because in this model high income earners earn most of their income from accumulated wealth. The Pareto exponent is significantly smaller in the low tax regime than in the high tax regime: 1.38 for \( \tau_2 = 0.28 \) and 2.06 for \( \tau_2 = 0.5 \).

The low tax rate strengthens the diffusion effect, because it increases the volatility of after-tax returns to capital. At the same time, the low tax rate weakens the influx effect, because it reduces the net inflow of households into the tail from below. Therefore, both effects induce a low Pareto exponent. The two tax rates used for Figure 7 emulate the U.S. Tax Reform Act in 1986. As studied by Feenberg and Poterba [19], an unprecedented decline in the Pareto exponent is observed right after the tax reform. Although the stable Pareto exponent right after the downward leap may suggest that the sudden decline was partly due to tax-saving behavior, the steady decline of the Pareto exponent in the 1990s may suggest more persistent effects of the tax reform. Piketty and Saez [45] suggested that the imposition of a progressive tax around the Second World War was the possible cause for the top income share remaining at a low level for a long time after the war, until the 1980s. Our simulations and the above analytical results are consistent with
Figure 7: Stationary distributions of wealth and income for the benchmark case ($\tau_2 = 0.5$) and the case of lower tax rate ($\tau_2 = 0.28$).
the view that a tax cut substantially reduces the stationary Pareto exponent. However, our analysis is limited to the comparison of stationary distributions, and the transition dynamics are beyond the scope of this paper.\footnote{We tackle this issue in a different paper (Aoki and Nirei \cite{4}).}

The above interpretations of the sensitivity analysis assume that the analysis in the Solow model can be extended to the Bewley economy, at least qualitatively. Since our Bewley economy incorporates many features, such as non-linear savings and taxation as well as autocorrelated shocks in returns and endowments, we cannot provide analytical justifications to this analogy. Nonetheless, we find that the comparative statics obtained by numerical analysis of the Bewley model fit well with the theoretical predictions obtained from the analytical formula shown with the Solow model.

5. Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that the neoclassical growth model with idiosyncratic investment risks is able to generate the Pareto distribution as the stationary distributions of income and wealth at the balanced growth path. We explicitly determine the Pareto exponent in terms of the fundamental parameters, and provide an economic interpretation for its determinants in a general equilibrium analysis. In particular, we emphasize the role played by precautionary savings in determining the Pareto exponent.

The Pareto exponent is determined by the balance between two factors: savings from labor income, which determines the influx of population from the middle class to the tail part, and asset income contributed by risk-taking behavior, which corresponds to the diffusion effect making the tail distribution less equal. We show that an increase in the variance of the idiosyncratic investment shock lowers the Pareto exponent. While this
paper features risky investments in physical capital, the Pareto tail should be similarly obtained when the risky asset takes the form of human capital. The essential feature of the model is that the households own a stock factor of production with risky returns and a flow factor of production that is always positive. The risky returns generate the diffusion effects, while the flow factor provides the influx effect. Our analysis in Appendix B shows that the redistribution policy financed by an income or bequest tax raises the Pareto exponent, because the tax reduces the diffusion effect and increases the influx effect. Similarly, increased risk sharing raises the Pareto exponent.

The analytical results shown in the Solow model hold in a Bewley model, wherein the savings rate is optimally determined by the households. In a benchmark case without borrowing constraints, the Bewley model generates a log-normal process for individual wealth that implies a counterfactual “escaping” path of less and less equal distributions. One way to reestablish the Pareto distribution of wealth and income is to incorporate a random reset event by which each household lineage is discontinued. We emphasize a new factor that prevents the distribution from diverging and generates the Pareto exponent: precautionary savings generated by a binding borrowing constraint. We conduct sensitivity analyses of the Pareto exponent for the death rate, tax rate, return volatility, and labor endowment volatility. Results obtained by numerical computation agree with the mechanism of the determination of the Pareto exponent derived in the Solow model.

The agreement between the Solow model and the Bewley model with borrowing constraints points to the key roles played by the influx effect and the diffusion effect in generating the Pareto distribution. Without idiosyncratic investment shocks, the model lacks the diffusion effect and thus no Pareto distribution emerges. The influx effect is also necessary for generating Pareto distributions, and it is affected by a variety of economic fundamentals other than the death rate of households. For example, either a stricter bor-
rowing limit or a riskier labor income leads to greater precautionary savings, resulting in a higher Pareto exponent. In the Solow model, savings by the low wealth group correspond to the savings of households with no wealth, which serve as a reflective lower bound of wealth accumulation and exert the influx effect on the Pareto exponent. Our numerical analysis with varying borrowing constraints shows that this effect can be quantitatively considerable.

Appendix A. Proofs for the propositions in Section 2.3

Proof of Proposition 2. We first show the unique existence of a solution $\lambda$ for (14). Note that \((d/d\lambda)E(g^\lambda) = E(g^\lambda \log g)\) and \((d^2/d\lambda^2)E(g^\lambda) = E(g^\lambda (\log g)^2)\). Since $g > 0$, the second derivative is positive, and thus, $E(g^\lambda)$ is convex in $\lambda$. As $\lambda \to \infty$, $g^\lambda$ is unbounded for the region $g > 1$ and converges to zero for the region $g < 1$, while the probability of $g > 1$ is unchanged. Thus, $E(g^\lambda)$ eventually becomes greater than 1 as $\lambda$ increases to infinity. Further, recall that $E(g) < 1$. Thus, for the range $\lambda > 1$, $E(g^\lambda)$ is a continuous convex function that travels from below 1 to above 1. This establishes that the solution for $E(g^\lambda) = 1$ exists uniquely in the range $\lambda > 1$, and that the solution $\bar{\lambda}$ satisfies \((d/d\lambda)E(g^\lambda)|_{\lambda=\bar{\lambda}} > 0\).

Next, we show that $\lambda$ is decreasing in $\sigma$ by showing that an increase in $\sigma$ is a mean-preserving spread in $g$. Recall that $g$ follows a shifted log-normal distribution, where $\log u = \log(g - a)$ follows a normal distribution with mean $u_0 - \sigma_u^2/2$ and variance $\sigma_u^2$. Note that the distribution of $u$ is normalized so that a change in $\sigma_u$ is mean-preserving for $g$. The cumulative distribution function of $g$ is $F(g) = \Phi((\log(g - a) - u_0 + \sigma_u^2/2)/\sigma_u)$, where $\Phi(\cdot)$ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. Then,

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial \sigma_u} = \phi \left( \frac{\log(g - a) - u_0 + \sigma_u^2/2}{\sigma_u} \right) \left( -\frac{\log(g - a) - u_0}{\sigma_u^2} + \frac{1}{2} \right), \quad (A.1)$$

34
where \( \phi(\cdot) \) is the derivative of \( \Phi \). Using the change in variable \( x = (\log(g - a) - u_0 + \sigma_u^2/2)/\sigma_u \), we obtain

\[
\int g \frac{\partial F}{\partial \sigma_u} dg = \int \phi(x)(-x/\sigma_u + 1)dx dg/dx \quad \text{(A.2)}
\]

\[
= \sigma_u e^{u_0} \int \frac{-x/\sigma_u + 1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-(x-\sigma_u)^2/2} dx, \quad \text{(A.3)}
\]

The last line reads as a partial moment of \(-x/\sigma_u + 1\), wherein \( x \) follows a normal distribution with mean \( \sigma_u \) and variance 1. The integral tends to 0 as \( \bar{x} \to \infty \), and the integrand is positive for \( x \) below \( \sigma_u \) and negative above \( \sigma_u \). Thus, the partial integral achieves the maximum at \( \bar{x} = \sigma_u \) and then monotonically decreases toward 0. Hence, the partial integral is positive for any \( \bar{x} \), and so is \( \int g \frac{\partial F}{\partial \sigma_u} dg \). This completes the proof for the assertion that an increase in \( \sigma_u \) is a mean-preserving spread in \( g \).

Since \( g^\lambda \) is strictly convex in \( g \) for \( \lambda > 1 \), a mean-preserving spread in \( g \) strictly increases \( E(g^\lambda) \). As was observed, \( E(g^\lambda) \) is also strictly increasing in \( \lambda \) locally at \( \lambda = \bar{\lambda} \). Thus, an increase in \( \sigma_u \), and thus, an increase in \( \sigma \) while \( \alpha \) is fixed, results in a decrease in \( \bar{\lambda} \) that satisfies \( E(g^\lambda) = 1 \).

**Proof of Proposition 3.** We repeatedly use the fact that when \( \log a_{i,t} \) follows a normal distribution with mean \(-\sigma^2/2\) and variance \( \sigma^2 \), \( a_0 \log a_{i,t} \) also follows a normal distribution with mean \(-a_0\sigma^2/2\) and variance \( a_0^2\sigma^2 \). When \( \delta = 1 \), the growth rate of \( k_{i,t} \) becomes a log-normally distributed variable \( g = \alpha a_{i,t}^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}/E(a_{i,t}^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}) \). Then, \( g^\lambda \) also follows a log-normal with log-mean \( \lambda(\log \alpha - \log E(a_{i,t}^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}) - (\sigma^2/2)((1-\alpha)/\alpha)) \) and log-variance \( \lambda^2((1-\alpha)/\alpha)^2\sigma^2 \). Then, we obtain

\[
1 = E(g^\lambda) = e^{\lambda(\log \alpha - \log E(a_{i,t}^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}) - (\sigma^2/2)((1-\alpha)/\alpha)) + \lambda^2((1-\alpha)/\alpha)^2\sigma^2/2} \quad \text{(A.4)}
\]

\[
= e^{\lambda(\log \alpha - (\sigma^2/2)((1-\alpha)/\alpha)^2) + \lambda^2((1-\alpha)/\alpha)^2\sigma^2/2}. \quad \text{(A.5)}
\]

35
Taking the logarithm of both sides, we solve for \( \lambda \) as
\[
\lambda = 1 - \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \right)^2 \log \frac{\alpha}{\sigma^2 / 2}.
\] (A.6)

Proof of Proposition 4. From the definition of \( g_{i,t} \) (11), we obtain
\[
\mathbb{E}(g_{i,t}^2) = \left( \frac{1 - \delta}{\gamma} \right)^2 + 2 \frac{1 - \delta \alpha}{\gamma} (\gamma - 1 + \delta) + \left( \frac{\alpha}{\gamma} (\gamma - 1 + \delta) \right)^2 \frac{\mathbb{E}(a_{i,t}^{2(1-\alpha)/\alpha})}{\mathbb{E}(a_{i,t}^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha})^2}. \] (A.7)

By applying the formula for the log-normal, we obtain
\[
\frac{\mathbb{E}(a_{i,t}^{2(1-\alpha)/\alpha})}{\mathbb{E}(a_{i,t}^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha})^2} = e^{-\sigma^2(1-\alpha)/\alpha + 2\sigma^2(1-\alpha)^2/\alpha^2} = e^{\left( \frac{\sigma(1-\alpha)}{\alpha} \right)^2}. \] (A.8)

Combining these results with the condition \( \mathbb{E}(g^2) = 1 \), after some manipulation we obtain
\[
\hat{\sigma}^2 = \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \right)^2 \log \left( \frac{1}{\alpha^2} \left( 1 + \frac{2(1 - \alpha)}{\gamma/(1 - \delta) - 1} \right) \right). \] (A.9)

We observe that an increase in \( \gamma \) or \( \delta \) decreases \( \hat{\sigma} \). By Proposition 2, \( \lambda \) is decreasing in \( \sigma \). Thus, in the neighborhood of \( \lambda = 2 \), the stationary \( \lambda \) is decreasing in \( \gamma \) or \( \delta \), because an increase in either \( \gamma \) or \( \delta \) decreases \( \hat{\sigma} \) relative to the current level of \( \sigma \).

Appendix B. Redistribution policies in the Solow model

In this section, we extend the Solow framework to redistribution policies financed by taxes on income and bequests. This extension provides an analytical framework to interpret the numerical results on income tax in the Bewley model in Section 3. Moreover, by this extension we incorporate, as a limiting case, the classic argument by Stiglitz [53] that the Solow economy leads to a completely equal distribution of wealth.

Let \( \tau_y \) denote the flat-rate tax on income, and let \( \tau_b \) denote the flat-rate bequest tax on inherited wealth. The tax proceeds are equally redistributed among the households. We
assume that a household changes generations with probability $\mu$ in each period. Thus, the household wealth is taxed at flat rate $\tau_b$ with probability $\mu$ and remains intact with probability $1 - \mu$. We denote the bequest event by a random variable $1_b$ that takes 1 with probability $\mu$ and 0 with probability $1 - \mu$. Then, the capital accumulation equation (7) is modified as follows:

$$
\gamma k_{i,t+1} = (1 - \delta - 1_b \tau_b) k_{i,t} + s((1 - \tau_y)(\pi_{i,t} + w_t e_{i,t}) + \tau_y Y_t + \tau_b \mu K_t).
$$

(B.1)

By aggregating, we recover the law of motion for $K_t$ as in (8). Therefore, the redistribution policy does not affect $\bar{K}$ or aggregate output at the steady state. Combining with (B.1), the accumulation equation for individual wealth is rewritten at $\bar{K}$ as follows:

$$
k_{i,t+1} = \hat{g}_{i,t} k_{i,t} + \hat{z} e_{i,t},
$$

(B.2)

where the newly defined growth rate $\hat{g}_{i,t}$ and the savings term $\hat{z}$ are given as follows:

$$
\hat{g}_{i,t} \equiv \frac{1 - \delta - 1_b \tau_b}{\gamma} + \frac{(1 - \tau_y)\alpha(\gamma - 1 + \delta)}{\gamma} \frac{a_{i,t}^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}}{E(a_{i,t}^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha})},
$$

(B.3)

$$
\hat{z} \equiv \frac{(1 - \alpha + \alpha \tau_y) sA}{\gamma} \left( \frac{sA}{\gamma - 1 + \delta} \right)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} + \tau_b \mu \left( \frac{sA}{\gamma - 1 + \delta} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)}.
$$

(B.4)

This is a Kesten process, and the Pareto distribution is immediately obtained.

**Proposition 6.** Under the redistribution policy, if the probability for $\hat{g}_{i,t} > 1$ is strictly positive, a household’s wealth $k_{i,t}$ has a stationary distribution whose tail follows a Pareto distribution with exponent $\lambda$ that satisfies $E(\hat{g}_{i,t}^\lambda) = 1$. An increase in income tax $\tau_y$ or bequest tax $\tau_b$ raises $\lambda$, while $\lambda$ is not affected by the savings rate $s$.

Since the taxes $\tau_y$ and $\tau_b$ both shift the density distribution of $\hat{g}_{i,t}$ downward, they raise the Pareto exponent $\lambda$ through the condition $E(\hat{g}_{i,t}^\lambda) = 1$.

The redistribution financed by bequest tax $\tau_b$ has an effect similar to that of a random discontinuation of household lineage. By setting $\tau_b$ accordingly, we can incorporate the
situation where a household may have no heir, and all its wealth is confiscated and redistributed by the government, and a new household replaces it with no initial wealth. A decrease in mortality ($\mu$) in such an economy will reduce the stationary Pareto exponent $\lambda$. Thus, larger longevity results in a less equal tail distribution.

The redistribution financed by income tax $\tau_y$ collects a fraction of profits and equally transfers the proceeds to the households. Thus, income tax serves as a means to share idiosyncratic investment risks across households. When the transfer is uncorrelated with the capital holding, it works as another additive term to wealth accumulation. Thus, how the transfer is allocated does not affect $\lambda$, as long as the distribution of the transferred amount has a thin tail.

If the transfer is proportional to the capital holding, the redistribution scheme by the income tax is equivalent to an institutional change that allows households to better insure against the investment risks. The importance of capital market imperfections in determining income distributions is emphasized by Banerjee and Newman [5] and Galor and Zeira [23]. In this context, we obtain the following result.

**Proposition 7.** Consider a risk-sharing mechanism that collects $\tau_s$ fraction of profits $\pi_{i,t}$ and refunds its ex-ante mean $E(\tau_s \pi_{i,t})$ as rebate. Then, an increase in $\tau_s$ raises $\lambda$.

The proof is as follows. Partial risk sharing ($\tau_s > 0$) reduces the weight on $\epsilon_{i,t}$ in (B.3) while keeping the mean of $\tilde{g}_{i,t}$. Then, $\tilde{g}_{i,t}$ before the risk sharing is a mean-preserving spread of the new $\tilde{g}_{i,t}$. Since $\lambda > 1$, a mean-preserving spread of $\tilde{g}_{i,t}$ increases the expected value of its convex function $\tilde{g}_{i,t}^\lambda$. Thus, risk sharing must raise $\lambda$ in order to satisfy $E(\tilde{g}_{i,t}^\lambda) = 1$. When the households completely share the idiosyncratic risks, the model converges to the classic case of Stiglitz [53], wherein wealth is equally distributed across households.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 5

In this section, we solve the Bewley model with “natural” borrowing constraint and pension program, and show the existence of the balanced growth path. Then the proposition obtains directly by applying Manrubia and Zanette [35].

At the steady state of detrended aggregate capital $\bar{K}$, the return to physical capital (18) is written as:

$$r_{i,t} = \alpha \left( \frac{a_{i,t}}{A} \right)^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha} \bar{K}^{\alpha - 1} + 1 - \delta,$$

which is a stationary process. The average return is:

$$\bar{r} \equiv E(r) = \alpha A \bar{K}^{\alpha - 1} + 1 - \delta. \tag{C.2}$$

The lending market must clear in each period, which requires $\int b_{i,t} di = 0$ for any $t$. We also note that $r_i$ is independent of $k_i$. Thus, aggregate total wealth satisfies $\int W_{i,t} di = (1 - \mu)^{-1} \bar{r} \bar{K}_t + H_t$. At the balanced growth path, aggregate total wealth, non-human wealth, and human wealth grow at $\gamma$. Let $W$, $H$, and $\bar{w}$ denote aggregate total wealth, human capital, and the wage rate detrended by $\gamma^t$ at the balanced growth path, respectively. Then we have:

$$\bar{W} = (1 - \mu)^{-1} \bar{r} \bar{K} + \bar{H}. \tag{C.3}$$

Combining the market clearing condition for lending with the policy function for lending, we obtain the equilibrium risk-free rate:

$$R = \frac{\gamma(1 - \mu) \bar{H}}{s(1 - \theta) \bar{W}}. \tag{C.4}$$

By using the conditions above and substituting in the policy function for savings, the budget constraint aggregated across households becomes:

$$(\gamma - s(1 - \mu)^{-1} \bar{r}) \bar{K} = (s - (1 - \mu)R^{-1} \gamma) \bar{H}. \tag{C.5}$$
Plugging into (C.4), we obtain the relation:

\[ R = \frac{\gamma (1 - \mu)}{s(1 - \theta)} - \frac{\theta}{1 - \theta} \bar{r}. \]  

(C.6)

Thus, the mean return to the risky asset and the risk-free rate are determined by \( \bar{K} \) from (C.2,C.6). The expected excess return is solved as:

\[ \bar{r} - R = \frac{1}{1 - \theta} \left( \alpha AK^{\alpha - 1} + 1 - \delta - (1 - \mu)\frac{\gamma}{s} \right). \]  

(C.7)

If \( \log a_{i,t} \sim N(-\sigma^2/2, \sigma^2) \), then we have \( A = e^{\sigma^2(1-\alpha)/(1/\alpha - 2)} \). This shows a relation between the expected excess return and the shock variance \( \sigma^2 \).

By using (4,5), the human wealth is written as:

\[ \bar{H} = \gamma^{-t} \left( \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \bar{w} \gamma^\tau (1 - \mu)^{\tau-t} \prod_{s=t+1}^{\tau} R_s^{-1} \right) = \frac{\bar{w}}{1 - (1 - \mu)\gamma R^{-1}} = \frac{(1 - \alpha)AK^{\alpha}}{1 - (1 - \mu)\gamma R^{-1}}. \]  

(C.8)

Equations (C.2,C.5,C.6,C.8) determine \( \bar{K}, \bar{H}, R, \bar{r} \). In what follows, we show the existence of the balanced growth path in the situation when the parameters of the optimal policy \( s, \theta \) reside in the interior of (0,1). By using (C.2,C.6,C.8), we have:

\[ \frac{\bar{K}}{\bar{H}} = \frac{1 - \gamma(1-\mu)\gamma s(1-\theta)}{(1 - \alpha)AK^{\alpha - 1}}. \]  

(C.9)

The right hand side function is continuous and strictly increasing in \( \bar{K} \), and travels from 0 to +\( \infty \) as \( \bar{K} \) increases from 0 to +\( \infty \).

Now, the right hand side of (C.5) is transformed as follows:

\[ \bar{H}(s - (1 - \mu)\gamma R^{-1}) = \bar{H} \left( s - s(1 - \theta) \frac{\bar{W}}{\bar{H}} \right) = \bar{H} s \left( 1 - (1 - \theta) \left( (1 - \mu)^{-1} \bar{r} \bar{K} + 1 \right) \right) \]

\[ = \bar{H} s \left( \theta - (1 - \theta)(1 - \mu)^{-1} \bar{r} \bar{K} \right). \]  

(C.10)

Then we rearrange (C.5) as:

\[ \frac{\gamma}{s \theta} \frac{\bar{K}}{\bar{H}} = 1 + (1 - \mu)^{-1} \bar{r} \bar{K}. \]  

(C.11)
By (C.2), $\bar{r}$ is strictly decreasing in $\bar{K}$, and $R$ is strictly increasing by (C.6). Thus, $\bar{W}/\bar{H}$ is strictly decreasing by (C.4), and so is $\bar{r}\bar{K}/\bar{H}$ by (C.3). Thus, the right hand side of (C.11) is positive and strictly decreasing in $\bar{K}$. The left hand side is monotonically increasing from 0 to $+\infty$. Hence, there exists a unique steady-state solution $\bar{K}$. This verifies the unique existence of the balanced growth path.

The law of motion (25) for the detrended individual total wealth $k_{i,t}$ is now completely specified at the balanced growth path:

$$k_{i,t+1} = \begin{cases} 
\tilde{g}_{i,t+1}k_{i,t} \text{ with prob. } 1-\mu \\
\bar{H} \text{ with prob. } \mu, 
\end{cases} \quad (C.12)$$

where,

$$\tilde{g}_{i,t+1} \equiv \left(\theta r_{i,t+1} + (1-\theta)R\right)s/(1-\mu). \quad (C.13)$$

This is the stochastic multiplicative process with reset events studied by Manrubia and Zanette [35]. By applying their result, we obtain the proposition.

**Appendix D. Details of numerical computation**

This section explains the computation procedure used for Section 4. Wealth $W_i$ is discretized by 400 grid points separated equally in log-scale in the range between $10^{-2}$ and $10^{10}$. The autoregressive process of $e_{i,t}$ is discretized by Rouwenhorst’s quadrature method (Kopecky and Suen [33]). To compute the stationary equilibrium of the Bewley model with portfolio choice, we use a two-step algorithm similar to Barillas and Fernández-Villaverde [6]. In the first step, we solve the savings choice given a portfolio policy, and we solve the portfolio policy given the savings choice in the second step.

1. Initialize $\theta(W,a,\epsilon)$
   (a) Initialize $K$
i. Compute \( w \) and \( r(a) \)

ii. Solve for household’s savings policy \( x(W, a, \epsilon) \)

iii. Compute the stationary distribution of \((W_i, a_i, \epsilon_i)\)

iv. Compute stationary \( K \). Repeat (a) until \( K \) converges

(b) Initialize \( R \)

i. Solve for household’s portfolio policy \( \theta(W, a, \epsilon) \)

ii. Compute aggregate bond demand \( \int_0^1 b_i di \). Adjust \( R \) and repeat (b) until the aggregate bond demand converges to 0

2. Repeat 1 until \( \theta(W, a, \epsilon) \) converges

In the algorithm above, (a-i) uses (C.1) and the profit maximization condition. In (a-ii), the households’ dynamic programming problem is solved by the endogenous grid-point method with linear interpolation. In (a-iii), we first compute \( W_{i,t+1} \) for given \( W_{i,t}, a_{i,t}, a_{i,t+1}, \epsilon_{i,t}, \epsilon_{i,t+1} \), where \( W_{i,t} \) is chosen at a grid point of wealth. The probability for this transition is computed by combining the transition matrices for \( a_i \) and the discretized \( \epsilon_i \). Thus, we obtain a transition matrix for \( W_i \). The stationary distribution of \( W_i \) is obtained by forward simulation, that is, by iterating the multiplication of the transition matrix. The resulting stationary distribution of wealth has a fat tail, but the average wealth always exists since the Pareto exponent is greater than 1. We make the maximum grid for wealth quite large \( (10^{10}) \) so that the marginal propensity to consume for the households with high wealth can be computed accurately.

The convergence of aggregate capital in (a) and aggregate bonds in (b) are obtained by the bisection method applied to \( K \) and \( R \), respectively. The criterion for convergence is set as \( 10^{-9} \) for the savings policy function, \( 10^{-4} \) for aggregate capital and bonds, \( 10^{-3} \) for \( \theta \) in the outer loop, and \( 10^{-2} \) for the estimated Pareto exponent of the stationary wealth distribution in the outer loop.
Policy functions show savings $k' + b' + \phi$ and capital holding $k'$ conditional on total resources $W$ for a household with low or high productivity $a$ and with the median value of labor endowment $e$. Total resources, savings, and capital are normalized by the median total resources. Note that the savings and capital levels coincide for the households with high productivity, because they choose to hold all their wealth in capital.

Figure D.8 shows a part of the computed policy functions and the Lorenz curve for the benchmark calibration. We note that the households with high productivity invest all their wealth in risky assets, and thus $k_{i,t+1}$ and $k_{i,t+1} + b_{i,t+1} + \phi$ coincide for them. We also note that the households with low productivity hold some bonds when their wealth is in the middle level or in the very high level. Bonds supplied by those households are absorbed by the households with high productivity and the households with low wealth. Under the benchmark calibration, the capital-output ratio is 1.55 and the consumption-output ratio is 0.67. The risk-free rate is 0.085, while the risky capital generates the net rate of return 0.079 in the low productivity state and 0.345 in the high productivity state.

References


