Beauty Contests and Fat Tails in Financial Markets

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Abstract

This paper demonstrates that fat-tailed distributions of trade volume and stock returns emerge in a simultaneous-move herding model of rational traders who infer other traders' private information on the value of assets by observing aggregate actions. Without parametric assumptions on the private information, I analytically show that the traders’ aggregate actions follow a power-law distribution. Numerical simulations show that the model is able to generate the fat-tailed distributions of returns as observed empirically. I argue that the learning among a large number of traders leads to a criticality condition for the power-law clustering of actions.

Keywords: Herd behavior, trade volume, stock return, fat tail, power law

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1 Introduction

Since Mandelbrot [29] and Fama [16], it has been well established that the short-term stock returns exhibit a fat-tailed, leptokurtic distribution. Jansen and de Vries [22], for example, estimated the exponent of the power-law tail to be in the range 3 to 5, which warrants a finite variance and yet deviates greatly from the normal distribution in the fourth moment. This anomaly in the tail and kurtosis has been considered as a reason for the excess volatility of stock returns.

Efforts to explain this anomaly have been ongoing for long. A traditional economic explanation for the excess volatility of the volumes and returns relies on the traders’ rational herd behavior. In a situation where a trader’s private information on the asset value is partially revealed by her transaction, the trader’s action can cause an avalanche of similar actions by the other traders. This idea of a chain reaction through the revelation of private information has been extensively studied in the literature of herd behavior, informational cascade, and information aggregation. However, there have been few attempts to explain the fat tail in this framework. This paper shows that the chain reaction of information revelation leads to the fat-tail distributions of the traders’ aggregate actions and asset returns.

I consider a model of a large number of informed traders who receive imperfect private information on the true value of an asset. The traders simultaneously choose whether to buy one unit of the asset or not to buy at all. I consider a rational expectations equilibrium in which each trader submits her demand schedule conditional on price. The trader’s rational choice is based on her private information as well as the information revealed by the other traders’ actions through the equilibrium price. The price is set by an auctioneer who aggregates the informed traders’ demand and matches the demand with the supply schedule submitted by uninformed traders. The
equilibrium is a mapping from the space of private information of all traders to that of the aggregate actions. The larger the aggregate buying action, the more is the traders’ subjective belief on the state of a high asset value, and the more likely each trader is to buy the asset. Hence, the traders’ strategy exhibits complementarity, and their actions are positively correlated.

I derive the probability distribution of the equilibrium aggregate action and show that it decays as a power function possibly with exponential truncation. The speed of the exponential truncation is determined by the strength of the strategic complementarity among traders. This analytical result is obtained by a new method that utilizes a fictitious stochastic tatonnement process to characterize the aggregate actions. The power-law distribution implies a large kurtosis. Thus, the power-law result illustrates that a significant magnitude of aggregate risk exists even when the uncertainty in the transaction volume solely stems from the idiosyncratic private information drawn by a large number of traders.

I extend the model dynamically in which the traders receive private information repeatedly. Suppose that the initial belief started far below the threshold belief. Then, traders buy only if they receive extremely good news. As private information is accumulated over time, however, the average belief increases toward a threshold at which some traders start buying regardless of the other traders’ inactions. Such traders’ buying actions trigger the other traders’ buying, which results in a herd that follows a power-law distribution. This process implies that a large amount of private information tends to be revealed at once around the point of time when the average belief reaches some threshold. Thus, even though the subjective belief converges to the true value of an asset in the long run, the price process toward the true value can deviate significantly from the smooth path that would occur if the private information is fully
revealed in each period. A sizable portion of the total price adjustment toward the true value is accounted for by the rare events of synchronized actions of a large number of traders.

The model can account for the non-normal, fat-tailed distribution of daily stock returns. The private information partially revealed by informed traders in the equilibrium transaction is reflected in the resulting shift in the price. I define the difference in the logarithm of price as the stock return. The impact of the transaction volume on the return is determined by the supply function of uninformed traders (or “liquidity suppliers”), which is calibrated as in Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou, and Stanley [17]. Each realization of the private information profile results in an equilibrium return, and thus, the returns distribution is obtained by Monte Carlo simulations of information draws. The simulated distribution is shown to resemble well the daily returns distribution observed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.

As a herding model, this model is analogous to the Keynes’ beauty contest. Each trader recognizes that the other traders have private information that is as valuable as her own. When each trader tries to match with the behavior of an average trader, the resulting equilibrium exhibits fragility due to perfect strategic complementarity. In addition, if the trader’s action is discrete, the equilibrium becomes locally unique and allows quantitative characterization of the fluctuations due to the randomness in private information. This paper formalizes the idea of perfect strategic complementarity among the traders with private information, and shows that a power-law distribution of the aggregate actions emerges naturally in this setup.

An extensive array of literature addresses the issue of imitative behavior in financial markets. The models of herd behavior and informational cascade by Scharfstein and Stein [34], Banerjee [5], and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [6] have been applied
to financial market crashes by Lee [26] and Chari and Kehoe [11] among others. While the benchmark herd behavior model provides a robust intuition for rational herding, it typically exhibits an all-or-nothing herding due to its particular information structure implied by sequential trading. Some modification is due in order to apply the intuition of herd behavior to stochastic fluctuations. Gul and Lundholm [18], for example, have demonstrated an emergence of stochastic herding by endogenizing the traders’ choice of waiting time. I extend this line of research by employing a simple simultaneous-move model of traders. This approach is related to Caplin and Leahy [10] who argue that the aggregate revelation of dispersed information in the market tends to occur suddenly as the last straw that breaks the camel’s back. Stretching their analogy, this paper claims that, when the camel’s back breaks, the rupture size is distributed according to a power law. Another underlying theme of this paper is the aggregation of private information (Vives [39]) or idiosyncratic shocks (Jovanovic [23]; Durlauf [14]). This paper shows that the aggregation of private information in the market leads to a non-trivial, structured fluctuation that is characterized by a power law.

The technical analysis I employ is linked to the field of critical phenomena in statistical physics. Recently, a number of statistical physicists investigated the empirical fluctuations of financial markets. Some papers in this literature reproduce the empirical power laws by introducing the methodology used for critical phenomena to the herd behavior models (Bak, Paczuski, and Shubik [3]; Cont and Bouchaud [12]; Stauffer and Sornette [38]). Two questions have been raised for the models of critical phenomena. One is that they lack the model of traders’ purposeful behavior and rational learning, which hinders the integration of their methodology to the existing body of financial

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1A survey of these attempts is provided in Bouchaud and Potters [8] and Mantegna and Stanley [30].
economics. The other is a fundamental question as to why at all the market has to exhibit criticality. The power-law fluctuation occurs typically only at the critical value of a parameter that governs the connectivity of the networked traders. Gabaix et al. [17] address these questions by incorporating the trader’s optimal behavior and by relating the power laws for the volumes and returns to Zipf’s law for the size distribution of firms. This paper proposes an alternative by showing that the market necessarily converges to the critical point as a result of the purposeful behavior of individual traders who gain information from each other just as in the Keynes’ beauty contest.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a simple static model is presented. Section 3 analytically derives the power-law distribution and provides an intuition for the mechanism behind the fat tail. Section 4 shows by numerical simulations that the equilibrium volumes follow a power law and that the equilibrium returns distribution matches its empirical counterpart. Section 5 discusses the role of discrete actions and symmetric information structure in the model. The model is also extended dynamically, and the power-law distribution is shown to occur at the state into which the heterogeneous beliefs of traders evolve. Section 6 concludes.

2 Model

2.1 Model and equilibrium

In this section, I consider the simplest case in which each trader receives private information just once. I consider a financial market with $N$ informed traders, where $N$ is a large finite number. The informed traders do not know the true state of the economy, but each of them receives private information $x_i$ that correlates with the state. The signal is private, meaning that trader $i$ does not observe the information received by
the other traders. The economy can take one of two possible states, $H$ and $L$. The asset is worth 1 in state $H$ and 0 in state $L$. The private information $x_i$ is drawn independently across $i$ from a known distribution $F$ in state $H$ and from $G$ in state $L$.

A share of the asset is assumed to be indivisible, and the unit of transaction is normalized by the number of traders, $1/N$. Traders choose either to buy it or not. The situation where traders choose to sell or not can be symmetrically analyzed. The buying action of trader $i$ is denoted by $a_i = 1$ and the non-buying action is denoted by $a_i = 0$. The informed trader’s choice is conditional on the price of asset, $p$. The demand function of the informed traders is denoted by $d_i(p, x_i)$. The aggregate demand function is defined as $D(p) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} d_i(p, x_i)/N$.

In addition to the informed traders, there are uninformed traders who act as liquidity suppliers of the asset. I assume that the uninformed traders have an aggregate supply function $S(p)$, which is continuous and upward sloping with a bounded first derivative in the range $0 \leq S \leq 1$ and satisfies $S(p_0) = 0$ for a given initial price $p_0$. Thus, uninformed traders are contrarians who sell when the price is high and buy when the price is low. The equilibrium price is determined so that it clears the market: $D(p) = S(p)$. I define a sequence of price points $p_k, k = 1, 2, \ldots, N$, at which price the demand from $k$ informed traders is met by suppliers: $S(p_k) = k/N$.

The transaction is implemented by an auctioneer. The auctioneer receives the demand and supply schedules $D$ and $S$ from the informed and uninformed traders.

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2Such liquidity (or noise) traders are often assumed in the literature of market microstructure. There is a systematic transfer from liquidity traders to informed traders, by which the informed traders sustain their business. Institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, for example, are often willing to incur such a loss since they need to liquidate assets at a fixed timing or they focus on long-term yields.

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and clears the market by setting price $p_m$ so that $D(p_m) = S(p_m)$.

Given $p_m$, the posterior belief of informed trader $i$ for state $H$ to occur is denoted by $b_{i,1}$. Informed traders are risk-neutral and maximize their subjective expected payoff. The expected payoff of a trader is 0 when $a_i = 0$ regardless of the belief, whereas it is equal to $b_{i,1} - p$ when $a_i = 1$. Thus, trader $i$ buys the asset if and only if $b_{i,1} \geq p$.

For each realization of $x$, a rational expectations equilibrium consists of price $p_m$, allocation $a$, demand schedule $d$, and posterior belief $b_1$, such that (i) for any $p$, $d_i(p, x_i)$ maximizes trader $i$'s expected payoff evaluated at the posterior belief $b_{i,1}$ for any $i$, (ii) $b_{i,1}$ is consistent with the realized private information $x_i$ and $p_m$ for any $i$, and (iii) the auctioneer clears the market as $S(p_m) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} a_i / N$, and delivers the orders $a_i = d_i(p_m, x_i)$.

### 2.2 Information structure and optimal strategy

I impose a standard assumption that private information has the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). I define an odds function $\delta(x_i) = g(x_i) / f(x_i)$, where $f$ and $g$ are derivatives of $F$ and $G$, respectively. MLRP requires $\delta$ to be monotone. Without loss of generality, I assume that $\delta$ is strictly decreasing. This assumption implies that a larger value of information $x_i$ signals a larger likelihood of state $H$. I also assume that the prior belief for $H$ to occur is common across $i$ at $b_0$. This assumption is imposed for the sake of simplicity, and is relaxed in Section 5.1, where the belief is allowed to

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3This implementation of a rational expectations equilibrium by the submission of demand schedules follows Bru and Vives [9]. Without the information aggregation by the auctioneer, the model would become similar to that of Minehart and Scotchmer [32], who showed that the traders cannot agree to disagree in a rational expectations equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium may not exist, or if it exists, it is a herding equilibrium where all the traders choose the same action.
evolve heterogeneously over periods.

Using a likelihood ratio $\theta_{i,1} \equiv (1 - b_{i,1})/b_{i,1}$, the optimality condition for a buying action $b_{i,1} \geq p$ is equivalently expressed as $\theta_{i,1} \leq 1/p - 1$. Thanks to MLRP, the optimal demand schedule of trader $j$ follows a threshold rule:

$$a_j = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x_j \geq \bar{x}(m), \\
0 & \text{otherwise},
\end{cases} \tag{1}$$

where $\bar{x}(m)$ denotes the value of private information at which trader $j$ is indifferent between buying and not buying given $p_m$.

Under the threshold rule, the likelihood ratios revealed by an inaction ($a_j = 0$) and by a buying action ($a_j = 1$) are derived as follows, respectively:

$$A(\bar{x}) \equiv \frac{\Pr(x_i < \bar{x} \mid L)}{\Pr(x_i < \bar{x} \mid H)} = \frac{G(\bar{x})}{F(\bar{x})}, \tag{2}$$

$$B(\bar{x}) \equiv \frac{\Pr(x_j \geq \bar{x} \mid L)}{\Pr(x_j \geq \bar{x} \mid H)} = \frac{1 - G(\bar{x})}{1 - F(\bar{x})}. \tag{3}$$

As in Smith and Sørensen [36], MLRP implies that, for any value of $\bar{x}$ in the interior of the support of $F$ and $G$,

$$A(\bar{x}) > \delta(\bar{x}) > B(\bar{x}) > 0, \tag{4}$$

and that $A(\bar{x})$ and $B(\bar{x})$ are strictly decreasing in $\bar{x}$:

$$\frac{dA}{d\bar{x}} = \frac{g(\bar{x})}{F(\bar{x})} - \frac{G(\bar{x})f(\bar{x})}{F(\bar{x})^2} = \frac{f(\bar{x})}{F(\bar{x})} (\delta(\bar{x}) - A(\bar{x})) < 0, \tag{5}$$

$$\frac{dB}{d\bar{x}} = -\frac{g(\bar{x})}{1 - F(\bar{x})} + \frac{(1 - G(\bar{x}))f(\bar{x})}{(1 - F(\bar{x}))^2} = \frac{f(\bar{x})}{1 - F(\bar{x})} (B(\bar{x}) - \delta(\bar{x})) < 0. \tag{6}$$

A buying trader infers from the equilibrium price $p_m$ that there are $m - 1$ informed traders buying and $N - m$ not buying. For a non-buying trader, the expected payoff is zero regardless of the trader’s posterior belief. The posterior likelihood for a buying
trader can be determined using the threshold rule above. Consider a buying trader at price \( p_1 \). If this bid is struck by the auctioneer, it implies that the other \( N - 1 \) informed traders do not bid at \( p_1 \). Thus, their actions (inactions) reveal the likelihood \( A(\bar{x}(1))^{N-1} \). The posterior likelihood in this case is \( \theta_{i,1} = A(\bar{x}(1))^{N-1}\delta(x_i)\theta_0 \). Thus, the threshold is determined by

\[
1/p_1 - 1 = A(\bar{x}(1))^{N-1}\delta(\bar{x}(1))\theta_0. \tag{7}
\]

Similarly, a trader buying at \( p_k \) knows that, if the bid is executed, there are \( k - 1 \) traders bidding at \( p_k \) and \( N - k \) traders not buying at \( p_k \). Then, the threshold \( \bar{x}(k) \) is obtained by solving

\[
1/p_k - 1 = A(\bar{x}(k))^{N-k}B(\bar{x}(k))^{k-1}\delta(\bar{x}(k))\theta_0. \tag{8}
\]

Given the threshold behavior above, I obtain the aggregate demand \( D(p_k) \) as the number of informed traders with \( x_i \geq \bar{x}(k) \) for \( k = 1, 2, \ldots, N \). I set \( D(p_0) = D(p_1) \), since \( p_0 \) and \( p_1 \) convey the same information to an informed trader that there is no other buying trader, while the purchasing cost \( p_0 \) is lower than \( p_1 \).

For a sufficiently large \( N \), it can be shown that \( \bar{x}(k) \) is strictly decreasing in \( k \). Thus, the more informed traders are buying, the more likely each informed trader is to buy. This implies that there is strategic complementarity among informed trader’s actions. Then, I immediately obtain the existence of equilibrium in a finite economy with strategic complementarity.

**Proposition 1** There exists \( \bar{N} \) such that for any \( N > \bar{N} \), there exists an equilibrium outcome \( m \) for each realization of \( x \).

Proof: See Appendix A.1.
The threshold strategy (1) allows multiple equilibria for each realization of $x$. Here, I focus on the case where the auctioneer selects the minimum number of buying traders, $m^*$, among possible equilibria for each $x$. The equilibrium selection uniquely maps each realization of $x$ to $m^*$. Thus, $m^*$ is a random variable if viewed unconditionally on $x$, and its probability distribution is determined by the probability measure of $x$ and the equilibrium selection mapping. I further characterize the probability distribution of $m^*$ and $p_{m^*}$ in the following sections.

By this selection assumption, I exclude the fluctuations that arise purely from informational coordination such as in sunspot equilibria. Thus, under this selection, I can show that even the minimum shift in equilibrium price $\log p_{m^*} - \log p_0$ exhibits large fluctuations. Moreover, the minimum equilibrium $m^*$ is known to be reached by the best response dynamics of traders, which Vives [41] called an informational tatonnement. The best response dynamics requires the traders to know only the “aggregate” information, $m$ in this case. Cooper [13] argued that the parsimonious informational requirement of the best response dynamics makes it a desirable equilibrium selection algorithm when there exist multiple equilibria and when it is difficult for traders to coordinate their actions.

3 Analytical derivation of the power law

In this section, I analytically derive the power-law distribution of the minimum aggregate action $m^*$ defined in the model. I propose a method to characterize the distribution of $m^*$ by using a fictitious tatonnement process. In so doing, I clarify the condition for the power law of $m^*$ and provide an economic interpretation for the mechanism that generates the power law. I assume that the true state of the economy is $H$ throughout
the paper. The case of $L$ can be analyzed similarly.

I start by showing that the informational tatonnement converges to $m^*$. I continue to use the notation developed for Proposition 1: I use $S$ for the set of $m$ and $\Gamma$ for the aggregate reaction function on $m$.

**Lemma 1** Consider an informational tatonnement process $m_u$, where $m_0 = 0$ and $m_u = \Gamma(m_{u-1})$ for $u = 1, 2, \ldots, T$, where the stopping time $T$ is the smallest $u$ such that $m_u - m_{u-1} = 0$. Then, $m_u$ converges to the minimum equilibrium $m^*$ for each realization of $x$. Moreover, the threshold decreases over the informational tatonnement process: $\bar{x}(m_{u+1}) < \bar{x}(m_u)$ for any realization of $x$.

Proof: See Appendix A.2.

Since the informational tatonnement starts from $m_0 = 0$ and converges to $m^*$, I can express $m^*$ as the sum of increments in the tatonnement process. Moreover, the informational tatonnement can be regarded as a stochastic process, once it is viewed unconditionally on the private information $x$. Thus, $m^*$ can be expressed as the sum of a stochastic process that starts from and converges to zero. I use this tatonnement as an algorithm to compute the minimum aggregate action $m^*$. The idea of characterizing an equilibrium outcome by a stochastic process is similar in spirit to Kirman [25].

By showing that the threshold $\bar{x}$ decreases over the stochastic process, Lemma 1 establishes that there exists a non-trivial chance of a chain reaction during the tatonnement. A trader who chooses to buy in $u$ will continue to choose to buy in $u + 1$, since the threshold is lowered. A trader who does not buy in $u$ might choose to buy in $u + 1$. The conditional probability of a non-buying trader switching to buying in response to $m_u - m_{u-1}$ is defined as follows:

$$q_u = \int_{\bar{x}_u}^{\bar{x}_{u-1}} f(x) dx / F(\bar{x}_{u-1}), \quad u = 1, 2, \ldots, N,$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)
where $\bar{x}_u$ is a shorthand for $\bar{x}(m_u)$. $q_u$ is always non-negative because of the decreasing threshold. Thus, $m_{u+1} - m_u$, the number of traders who buy in $u + 1$ for the first time, conditional on the tatonnement history up to $u$, follows a binomial distribution with population parameter $N - m_u$ and probability parameter $q_u$. The distribution of $m_1$ follows a binomial distribution with population $N$ and probability $q_0 \equiv 1 - F(\bar{x}_0)$. This completely defines the stochastic tatonnement process in the finite economy, as summarized in the following lemma.

**Lemma 2** Consider a stochastic process $m_u - m_{u-1}$, $u = 1, 2, \ldots, T$, where $m_0 = 0$. Suppose that $m_{u+1} - m_u$ conditional on $m_u - m_{u-1}$ follows a binomial distribution with population $N - m_u$ and probability $q_u$. Further, suppose that $m_1$ follows a binomial distribution with population $N$ and probability $q_0$. Then, the minimum equilibrium number of buying traders $m^*$ follows the same distribution as $m_T$, the cumulative sum of the process.

Lemma 2 establishes that the minimum equilibrium $m^*$ is equal to the sum of a binomial process. A binomial distribution permits Poisson approximation when the population is “large” and the probability is “small.” The approximation holds in our tatonnement if the probability $q_u$ declines as $1/N$. The next lemma shows that this is the case for $u > 1$.

**Lemma 3** As $N \to \infty$, the binomial process $m_{u+1} - m_u$ asymptotically follows a branching process with a state-dependent Poisson random variable with mean

$$\phi_u = \frac{A(\bar{x}_{u-1}) \log A(\bar{x}_{u-1}) - \log B(\bar{x}_{u-1})}{\delta(\bar{x}_{u-1})} \frac{A(\bar{x}_{u-1})}{B(\bar{x}_{u-1})} - 1, \quad u = 2, 3, \ldots, T. \tag{10}$$

Proof: See Appendix A.3.
A branching process is a stochastic integer process of population in which each individual (“parent”) in a generation bears a random number of “children” in the next generation. Lemma 3 shows that the number of newly buying traders in each step \( u + 1 \) asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution with mean \( \phi_u(m_u - m_{u-1}) \). Since \( m_u \) is an integer and since Poisson distribution is infinitely divisible, the tatonnement process asymptotically follows the branching process in which each newly buying trader in \( u \) induces a random number of other traders to buy in \( u + 1 \) according to a Poisson distribution with mean \( \phi_u \).

Lemma 3 shows that the asymptotic Poisson mean \( \phi_u \) is well defined for a given level of threshold \( \bar{x}_u \). This means that \( q_u \), the probability of a non-buying trader switching to buying in \( u \), declines as \( 1/N \). This implies that the decrease in the threshold \( \bar{x}_u \) in each step is of order \( 1/N \), by which I mean \( O(1/N) \), i.e., \( \bar{x}_{u-1} - \bar{x}_u \) multiplied by \( N \) converges to a non-zero constant as \( N \to \infty \). This property is important for the tatonnement process to generate a non-degenerate distribution of the total number of buying traders \( m^* \). If \( q_u \) is of order less than \( 1/N \), then \( m^* \) converges to zero as \( N \to \infty \). If \( q_u \) is of order greater than \( 1/N \), the process explodes to infinity with probability one as \( N \to \infty \). Only when \( q_u \) is of order \( 1/N \), \( m^* \) exhibits non-degenerate stochastic fluctuations.

Lemma 3 shows that the tatonnement can be approximated by a branching process with state-dependent Poisson mean. If the Poisson mean is constant across states, the sum of the branching process \( m_T \) conditional on \( m_1 \) follows a closed form distribution known as Borel-Tanner distribution in the queuing theory [24].

**Theorem 1** Consider a branching process \( m_u - m_{u-1} \) in which \( m_0 = 0 \), \( m_1 = l \), and \( m_{u+1} - m_u \) conditional on \( m_u - m_{u-1} = 1 \) follows a Poisson distribution with mean \( \phi \).
Then, the sum of the branching process $m_T$ has the following distribution:

$$\Pr(m_T = m) = \frac{(l/m)e^{-\phi m}(\phi m)^{m-l}}{(m-l)!}, \quad m = l, l+1, \ldots \quad (11)$$

where the second line holds asymptotically as $m \to \infty$.

Theorem 1 states that the sum of the Poisson branching process, conditional on the initial number of buying traders $m_1$, follows a power-law distribution with exponent 0.5 with exponential truncation (the exponent is defined for a cumulative distribution). The tail distribution as in (12) is known to be obtained not only for the Poisson branching process but also for any branching process (see Harris [19] and Sornette [37] for the robustness of this result for generalized branching processes). For the case $\phi > 1$, there is a non-zero probability for $m_T$ to be infinite. This is because the branching process $m_{u+1} - m_u$ does not reach 0 with a non-zero probability if $\phi > 1$, whereas it reaches 0 in a finite step with probability one if $\phi \leq 1$.

The exponential tail holds for a large finite $m_T$ either for the subcritical case $\phi < 1$ or the supercritical case $\phi > 1$ (Harris [19]). The speed of exponential truncation is determined by $|\phi - 1 - \log \phi|$. The speed of the exponential decay slows down as $\phi$ becomes close to 1, and disappears when $\phi = 1$. At this critical level $\phi = 1$, the branching process becomes a martingale, and the distribution (11) has a power-law tail. The power exponent (in the cumulative form) is 0.5, which is less than one, implying that the mean of $m_T$ diverges to infinity if $\phi = 1$. The exponent 0.5 is closely related to the same exponent that appears for the distribution of the first return time of a martingale.

Since our informational tatonnement does not generally have a constant branching mean during the process for a finite $N$, Theorem 1 does not generally apply to $m^*$. 15
Numerical simulations in Section 4 examine the deviations from distribution (11) in various specifications of the model. Here, I provide a special case in which the constant Poisson mean is obtained asymptotically.

The Poisson mean $\phi_u$ can be taken arbitrarily close to 1 regardless of $\bar{x}_u$ by setting $G(x)$ close to $F(x)$. Consider a series of economies with the number of informed traders $N = N_0, N_0 + 1, \ldots$ and the news distribution function $G_N$ that depends on $N$. Suppose that $G_N$ and $F$ become closer to each other. Then, I obtain the following proposition.

**Proposition 2** Suppose that the distribution functions $G_N$ converge to $F$ as $\lim_{N \to \infty} \sup_x |G_N(x) - F(x)| = 0$. Then, $\phi_u = 1$ for $u = 2, 3, \ldots, T$. Moreover, the asymptotic distribution function (11) in Theorem 1 holds with $\phi = 1$ for $m^*$ conditional on $m_1 = l$.

Proof: See Appendix A.4.

The convergence of $G_N$ to $F$ implies that the informativeness of the private information is vanishingly small. Such an infinitesimally small signal corresponds to, for example, the information that falls in a very short time span. Proposition 2 claims that the Poisson mean is asymptotically constant at 1 with such small signal. It implies that, firstly Theorem 1 holds for $m^*$, and secondly the criticality condition $\phi = 1$ holds. Thus, when the informativeness of the news is small and the number of traders is large, the propagation size of traders induced to buy $(m^* - m_1)$ by some initially buying traders $(m_1)$ follows a distribution with pure power-law. At $\phi = 1$, the equilibrium fluctuations exhibit criticality at which the tail distribution of herd size is so heavy that the mean number of herding traders is infinity while the probability of infinitely many traders to herd is barely zero.

Proposition 2 is concerned with the distribution of $m^*$ conditional on $m_1$. An unconditional asymptotic result for $m^*$ is obtained when the model environment is further specified. Suppose that $F$ follows an exponential distributions with mean $1/\lambda$.
and $G_N$ follows an exponential distribution with mean $1/\mu_N$, where $\mu_N = \lambda + 1/\log N$. Also assume that $\log((1/p_0 - 1)/\theta_0) > -1/\lambda$ holds. This provides a special case of the model in which $m^*$ asymptotically follows a power-law tailed distribution as follows.

**Proposition 3** Under the specification for $F, G_N, p_0$, and $\theta_0$ as above, there exists constant $\mu$ such that the minimum equilibrium number of buying traders $m^*$ asymptotically follows

$$\Pr(m^* = m) = \frac{\mu e^{-(m+\mu)}}{m!} (m + \mu)^{m-1}, \quad m = 0, 1, \ldots$$

(13)

$$\propto m^{-1.5},$$

(14)

where the second line holds asymptotically as $m \to \infty$.

**Proof:** See Appendix A.5.

What is the economic intuition for such a large fluctuation of $m^*$? The key to the fluctuation is the situation of the Keynes’ beauty contest in which each informed trader responds to the average behavior of the other informed traders. This can be seen from the threshold condition (8) for a fixed fraction of buying traders $\alpha = m/N$ at the limit of $N$: $(1 - \alpha) \log A(\bar{x}) + \alpha \log B(\bar{x}) = 0$. When a trader buys and thus raises $\alpha$, the other traders adjust their beliefs not only due to the observed action but also due to the observed inactions of the other traders. The buying action decreases the likelihood ratio of the other traders by a factor of $B/A$, and thus, decreases their threshold $\bar{x}$. The inactions of these traders under the revised threshold partially reveal their private information in turn in favor of not buying. As a result of these two forces, the threshold is shifted so that the impact on the public information caused by the triggering buying action is canceled out by the disbelief subsequently revealed by the inaction of bear traders.
Since there are $N$ traders in the market, the impact of one buying action on the threshold is of order $1/N$. This implies that the probability of a trader induced to buy by the lowered threshold is of order $1/N$. Since there are $N - m$ traders who can be induced to buy potentially, the branching mean of the newly buying traders $\phi$ becomes of order $N^0$. This is a natural order of magnitude for $\phi$ in the case of the symmetric information structure as I assume here, because the traders have no reason to imagine that the information revealed by an action should weigh more or less than that revealed by an inaction. Hence, it is a robust feature of beauty contest models that the chain-reaction mechanism operates near the criticality, which generates the fat-tailed distribution of the chain-reaction size.

For both Propositions 2 and 3, the crucial specification is that the informativeness $\sup |F - G|$ of the signal has to be small when $N$ is large. The informativeness of news depends on the unit of time adopted by the model. Thus, one interpretation of Proposition 3 is that the frequency domain for the critical fluctuations to occur depends positively on the number of traders in the market. Namely, for two markets with different numbers of traders to exhibit the same distribution function (13), the data sampling frequency has to be higher for the larger market.

Proposition 3 requires more restrictive specifications than Proposition 2. Those assumptions are needed mostly for assuring the asymptotic existence of the finite mean $\mu$ of the initial buying traders $m_1$. However, in a finite economy, the exact binomial distribution with population $N$ and probability $q_0$ can be often well approximated by a Poisson distribution with finite mean $Nq_0$. Thus, the distribution of $m^*$ (13) obtained under the particular specification may well approximate the distribution in broader environments. In the next section, I show that the derived distribution still serves as a good reference point for the fluctuations in finite economies with various specifications.
A note is due on the assumption \( \log\left(\frac{1/p_0 - 1}{\theta_0}\right) > -1/\lambda \). It is natural that the initial price \( p_0 \) is equal to the prior belief \( b_0 \) as traders are risk neutral. The assumption is satisfied in this case, since \( p_0 = b_0 \) implies \( 1/p_0 - 1 = \theta_0 \), and thus \( \log((1/p_0 - 1)/\theta_0) = 0 > -1/\lambda \). In the next section, I concentrate on the case \( b_0 = p_0 \) and confirm the power-law distribution by numerical simulations with finite \( N \).

When the assumption \( \log((1/p_0 - 1)/\theta_0) > -1/\lambda \) is violated, it is shown in Appendix A.5 that \( \bar{x}_N(1) \) declines faster in \( N \) and thus \( Nq_0 \to 0 \). Hence, when the price is too high, the propagation effect may not be triggered at all. This implies that there may be a particular timing for the critical fluctuations likely to occur in the course of price adjustments. For example, consider a dynamic situation where the prior belief is very low when the informed traders start to receive the private information signaling that the true state may be \( H \). Initially, informed traders are cautious about the information, and thus herding rarely occurs. As the increasing number of private signals accumulate, the subjective belief goes up and eventually enters the region that satisfies the assumption above, which causes the herding with a power-law size distribution. I pursue this implication in the dynamic extension of the model in Section 5.1.

4 Numerical results on volumes and returns distributions

In Proposition 2, I derived the power-law distribution of the minimum equilibrium aggregate action \( m^* \) conditional on \( m_1 \) analytically without parametrically specifying \( F \) and \( G_N \), but only asymptotically when \( N \) is taken to infinity and \( G_N \) is taken to \( F \). In Proposition 3, the unconditional distribution of \( m^* \) was derived under more specific environments. In this section, I show by numerical simulations that the probability
distribution of $m^*$ follows a dampened power law when $N$ is finite. In the simulations, I set the number of informed traders $N$ as finite but relatively large: 500 or 1000. $F$ and $G$ are specified as normal distributions with mean 1 and 0, respectively, and with the same standard deviation $\sigma$ that is relatively large: 25 or 50. The large standard deviation relative to the difference in mean captures the situation where the information value of the news is small. The common prior belief is set at $b_0 = 0.5$, reflecting the situation where traders put equal probabilities on the two states, and the initial price level fully reflects the belief as $p_0 = 0.5$.

It is extensively discussed in the literature as to how informed traders’ trades are incorporated in prices. For example, the no-trade theorem by Milgrom and Stokey [31] argued that no stable relation between the price and trades is necessarily predicted if the price reflects the publicly available information instantly. Smith [35] showed that a trader’s timing of trade will not be affected by public information either, since the price movement that reflects the public information will cancel out the effect of the public information on the trader’s belief. Considering this difficulty, Avery and Zemsky [2] proposed that another dimension of uncertainty is needed for herd behavior models to deal with stock price fluctuations. In this paper, I follow Gabaix et al. [17] who provide a micro-foundation for the square-root specification of a price impact function with a Barra model of uninformed traders that have a mean-variance preference and zero bargaining power against informed traders. Namely, I specify the inverse supply schedule of uninformed traders as $p_k = p_0 + p_0(k/N)^\gamma$, for $k = 1, 2, \ldots, N$, with $\gamma = 0.5$. This square-root specification falls within the empirically estimated range of the price impact (Lillo et al. [27]) and is used in the estimation of the price impact function (Hasbrouck and Seppi [20]).

A profile of private information $x$ is randomly drawn 100,000 times, and $m^*$ is
computed for each draw. Figure 1 plots the inverse cumulative distribution of $m^*/N$ for different values of $N$ and $\sigma$. The inverse distribution $\Pr_{\geq}(m^*)$ is cumulated from above, and is thus 0 at $m^* = N$ and 1 at $m^* = 0$. The distribution is plotted in log-log scale, and thus, a linear line indicates a power law $\Pr_{\geq}(m^*) \propto m^{*-\xi}$, where the slope of the linear line $\xi$ is called the exponent of the power law. The simulated distributions appear linear for smaller values of $m^*$, and decay fast when $m^*$ is close to $N$. This conforms to the model prediction that $m^*$ asymptotically follows a power-law distribution whereas the distribution is exponentially truncated due to the finiteness of $N$.

The asymptotic analysis also predicted $\xi = 0.5$. As shown in the left panel of Figure 1, I observe $\xi$ around 0.5 when $N = 1000$ and $\sigma = 25$. I observe the similar slope $\xi$ for $N = 2000$ and 4000 when the informativeness of private signal is taken smaller. This confirms the prediction of Proposition 3. However, I also note that $\xi$ takes larger values for other parameter sets. This might result from the fact that exponential truncation occurs at a small value of $m^*$ in these cases, or that the state-dependence of $\phi_u$ is strong enough to cause a large deviation from the predicted exponent $\xi$. Sornette [37] shows that the power-law exponent increases by 1 when the parameter $\phi$ travels across the criticality.

Our model also determines price $p_{m^*}$ for each equilibrium number of buying traders $m^*$. I interpret the shifts in log price caused by the equilibrium transactions, $\log p_{m^*} - \log p_0$, as stock returns, and plot the distributions of the simulated returns in the right panel of Figure 1. The density is logarithmically scaled, and thus, a linear decline indicates an exponential distribution. Notice that the returns are normalized by standard deviations, and the normalized returns span a wide range from -10 to 10. Thus, the plots well indicate that the simulated returns distributions exhibit the pattern of fat
Figure 1: Left: Inverse cumulative distributions of the minimum equilibrium number of buying traders $m^*$. $N$ is the number of traders, $\sigma$ is the standard deviation of the private information, and $\mu_H - \mu_L$ denotes the difference of the mean of the private information between states $H$ and $L$. Right: Distributions of price shifts $\log p_m - \log p_0$ tails with exponential truncation.

The simulated distribution of returns is compared to the empirical distribution in Figure 2. The returns distributions are plotted in semi-log scale in the left panel and in linear scale in the right panel. The daily returns data is generated using the TOPIX stock index in the Tokyo Stock Exchange during 1998-2010. I define the daily return as the log difference from the opening price to the closing price, rather than the return in a business day, in order to homogenize the time horizon of each observed return.

The simulated distribution is generated under the parameter set $N = 1000$ and $\sigma = 48.5$. The standard deviation of the information, $\sigma$, is set so that the density estimate at returns 0 matches with the empirical distribution, as shown in the right panel of Figure 2. The other parameters are set as in the previous simulations. I observe that the tail distribution (especially the left tail) of the empirical returns is
well replicated by the simulated tail in the left panel.

The herding behavior in our model results in the slow decay of the probability distribution of the fraction of buying traders $m^*/N$. This contrasts well to the case where traders act independently on their own private information. In this case, their action $a_i$ is independent across $i$, and thus, the central limit theorem predicts that $m^*/\sqrt{N}$ asymptotically follows the normal distribution, whose tail decays fast. Moreover, simulations show that the variance of $m^*/N$ does not decline as $N$ increases while $\sigma$ is fixed. The simulated variances are 8%, 9%, and 11% for the cases of $N = 500, 1000, \text{and } 2000$, respectively. This contrasts again with the case of no strategic complementarity, where the variance should decline linearly in $N$ according to the law of large numbers.

A power-law tail implies that the distribution belongs to the domain of the attraction of a stable law, i.e., the sum of the random variables distributed according to a power law also follows the power law with the same exponent. Thus, if the herd size of traders follows a power law independently in each period, the cumulated size of
the herds over periods should also follow a power law with the same exponent. If the power law is truncated exponentially, the central limit theorem comes into effect in the accumulation, and thus, the cumulated herd size would converge to a normal distribution as the time horizon increases. Hence, the distribution of herd size will exhibit a transition from a fat tail to a normal tail as the time horizon of the return increases. This is indeed empirically observed in the stock returns (Mantegna and Stanley [30]).

5 Discussions

5.1 Dynamic extension

The results in the basic model were derived under the assumption of homogeneous prior belief. The results hold even if the prior belief is heterogeneous. A particularly interesting case is when the belief evolves over time as private information is drawn repeatedly. In this case, even though I maintain the assumption that the prior belief in the initial period is homogeneous, the belief in the subsequent periods will be heterogeneous due to the past private information. In this sequence of static equilibria, I show that the informational tatonnement continues to be characterized as before.

The dynamic extension not only relaxes the assumption of common prior belief but also ensures that the propagation effect shown in the static model is triggered at some point of time. The limiting behavior of $q_0$ when $N \to \infty$ is ambiguous in the static model except for the case of Proposition 3. This leaves a possibility that the chain reaction is practically never triggered for a large $N$ if $q_0N \to 0$. This is because the traders will rarely react to the private information at the beginning of the tatonnement where no other traders reveal their information, if the prior belief is very low.

It turns out in the dynamic model that the traders eventually learn the true state
as they accumulate private information. This implies that regardless of the level of the initial prior belief or \(N\), the belief increases to the level at which traders start buying even though the other traders are not buying. This triggers the propagation of buying actions. This dynamics is similar to the self-organized criticality of Bak et al. [4] with respect to the traders' average belief converging to the state at which the size distribution of herd behavior is characterized by a power law.

### 5.1.1 Heterogeneous belief

I dynamically extend the basic model as follows. Each trader \(i\) draws private information \(x_{i,t}\) repeatedly over periods for \(t = 1, 2, \ldots\). The private information is identically and independently distributed across traders and periods. I consider the same asset as before that is worth 1 in \(H\) and 0 in \(L\). Traders are given an opportunity to buy this asset regardless of their past actions. Noise traders provide the supply function that has the same elasticity as in the static model but a different intercept \(S(p_{t-1}) = 0\). The intercept \(p_{t-1}\) reflects the equilibrium price in the previous period, as it incorporates the information revealed to the public in that period. Informed traders submit their demand schedule to an auctioneer who clears the market as in the static model. To maximize the expected payoff of the transaction in \(t\), trader \(i\) buys the asset in \(t\) if \(b_{i,t} \geq p_t\) and does not buy otherwise. There is no dynamic aspect involved in the traders' decision other than updating the belief.

Informed traders observe their private information history \(x^t_i = (x_{i,1}, x_{i,2}, \ldots, x_{i,t})\). I study a sequence of static equilibria \((p_t, a_t, b_t), t = 1, 2, \ldots\), such that the action \(a_{i,t}\) maximizes trader \(i\)'s expected period payoff under the subjective belief \(b_{i,t}\) (defined for the state \(H\) as before), which is consistent with the trader's observation.

The prior belief at the initial period is common, \(b_{i,0} = b_0\), but the belief is allowed
to evolve stochastically as the traders draw information repeatedly. Thus, the belief in each period \( t > 0 \) is heterogeneous across traders with a particular structure wherein the heterogeneity stems only from the distribution functions \( F \) and \( G \) that are ordered by MLRP.

Given an action profile history \( a_t^{t-1} \), all traders are divided into \( 2^{t-1} \) groups according to their action history \( a_t^{t-1} \). Let \( n_{k,t} \) denote the number of traders in the \( k \)-th group for \( k = 1, 2, \ldots, 2^{t-1} \) (hence, \( \sum_{k=1}^{2^{t-1}} n_{k,t} = N \)), and \( m_{k,t} \) denote the number of buying traders in the same group. Let \( X_{k,s} \) for \( s < t \) denote the domain of \( x_{i,s} \) that is consistent with \( a_s^i \) under the threshold strategy supposed in Proposition 4 below for trader \( i \) who belongs to group \( k \). The likelihood ratios revealed by an action history of a non-buying trader \( i \) and a buying trader \( j \) in group \( k \) are written as follows:

\[
A_{k,t} = \frac{\int_{X_{k,1}} \cdots \int_{X_{k,t-1}} G(\bar{x}_t(P_{k,t},x_{i,t}^{t-1}))dG(x_{i,t-1}) \cdots dG(x_{i,1})}{\int_{X_{k,1}} \cdots \int_{X_{k,t-1}} F(\bar{x}_t(P_{k,t},x_{i,t}^{t-1}))dF(x_{i,t-1}) \cdots dF(x_{i,1})},
\]

\[
B_{k,t} = \frac{\int_{X_{k,1}} \cdots \int_{X_{k,t-1}} (1 - G(\bar{x}_t(P_{k,t},x_{j,t}^{t-1})))dG(x_{j,t-1}) \cdots dG(x_{j,1})}{\int_{X_{k,1}} \cdots \int_{X_{k,t-1}} (1 - F(\bar{x}_t(P_{k,t},x_{j,t}^{t-1})))dF(x_{j,t-1}) \cdots dF(x_{j,1})}.
\]

In the static model, informed traders submit the demand schedule conditional on \( p_m \), where the conditioning on \( p_m \) is equivalent to conditioning on \( m \). In the dynamically extended model, I assume that informed traders submit their demand schedules conditional on the vector of the number of buying traders in each group, \( (m_{k,t})_k \). Let \( P_{k,t} \) denote the information inferred by trader \( i \) in group \( k \). \( P_{k,t} \) is written as

\[
P_{k,t} = \left( \prod_h A_{h,t}^{n_{h,t} - m_{h,t}} B_{h,t}^{m_{h,t}} \right) / B_{k,t}.
\]

I show that the equilibrium threshold strategy still exists in this setup.

**Proposition 4** For each realization of \( x^t \), there exists an equilibrium outcome \( (m_{k,t}) \)
and thresholds $\bar{x}_t$ such that the action profile $a_t$ satisfies the optimal threshold rule:

$$a_{i,t} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x_{i,t} \geq \bar{x}_t(P_{k,t}, x^{t-1}_i), \\
0 & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases} \quad (18)$$

Proof: See Appendix A.6.

The tatonnement process is characterized by a mixture of binomial distributions, which asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution. The threshold decreases over steps during the tatonnement within each node of history, and hence, we have a well-defined tatonnement process where a chain reaction of buying actions is possible.

5.1.2 Self-organized criticality

In this dynamic extension, traders accumulate private information that is independent across periods. Thus, through Bayesian learning by observing private information and aggregate actions, traders eventually learn the true state almost surely.

**Proposition 5** The subjective belief $b_{i,t}$ converges to 1 as $t \to \infty$ almost surely.

Proof: See Appendix A.7.

Proposition 5 means that the belief converges to the true state eventually. This is a natural consequence of the fact that traders have infinitely precise information in the long run as they accumulate their own private information repeatedly. The convergence of belief implies that there is no possibility for “wrong” herd behavior in the long run in the narrow sense that we have an infinite sequence of traders taking actions on the basis of a wrong belief or of traders completely neglecting their private information.

The convergence of belief to the true state $H$ means that all traders will buy eventually. This implies that some traders start buying even without any other trader buying at some point of the process toward convergence. Such a buying action triggers
the chain reaction of buying. Thus, the converging belief assures that the triggering actions eventually occur and almost surely cause the fat-tailed aggregate actions. The logic is analogous to the self-organized criticality proposed by Bak et al. [4]. In Bak’s sand-pile model, the distribution of avalanche size depends on a slowly-varying variable (the slope of the sand pile), and the dynamics of the slope variable has a global sink exactly at the critical point at which the avalanche size exhibits a power-law distribution. In our model, the average belief corresponds to the slope in the sand-pile model. The chain reaction is rarely triggered when the average belief is far below the threshold. As private information accumulates, the average belief increases toward the threshold. This ensures that the triggering buying action will occur eventually.

The dynamically extended model provides a time-series structure similar to Lee [26] for sudden shifts in stock prices. As the present static model is shown to match with the quantitative properties of unconditional fluctuations, the natural next step is to bring the dynamic model to the time-series properties as pursued by, for example, Alfarano, et al. [1]. I leave this exploration for future research.

5.2 Variation in market microstructure

In the benchmark model above, I characterize the distribution of the smallest equilibrium \( m^* \) under the assumption that the informed traders do not know this selection rule when multiple equilibria exist. This implies that the dampened power law characterizes a portion of fluctuations that arise from the local propagation of information among traders in the situation where the actual equilibrium fluctuations may also involve global shifts in equilibrium due to the sunspot-like coordination. In this section, I provide an alternative model in which informed traders know that the auctioneer selects the smallest \( m^* \). This modification has subtle effects on equilibrium, and there-
Figure 3: Simulated distributions of $m^*$ (left) and $\log p_m - \log p_0$ (right) when informed traders know the auctioneer’s selection rule of $m^*$.

Therefore, I can no longer characterize the dynamic case where the information is drawn repeatedly. However, the analysis for the static model still holds as shown below.

When traders know the selection rule, they not only know the number of buying and non-buying traders at $p_m$ but also know that there is no equilibrium at a price below $p_m$. Thus, they infer that there are at least $k + 1$ traders buying at $p_k$ for any $k < m$. This is equivalent to the fact that there are two traders with information greater than $\bar{x}(1)$ and one trader with $x_i \geq \bar{x}(k)$ for each $k = 2, 3, \ldots, m - 1$. The threshold condition is modified as

\[
\frac{1}{p_1} - 1 = A(\bar{x}(1))^{N-1}\delta(\bar{x}(1))\theta_0, \quad (19)
\]

\[
\frac{1}{p_2} - 1 = A(\bar{x}(2))^{N-2}B(\bar{x}(1))\delta(\bar{x}(2))\theta_0, \quad (20)
\]

\[
\frac{1}{p_m} - 1 = A(\bar{x}(m))^{N-m}B(\bar{x}(1))\Pi_{k=1}^{m-2}B(\bar{x}(k))\delta(\bar{x}(m))\theta_0, \quad m = 3, 4, \ldots, N. \quad (21)
\]

I can show that $\bar{x}(m)$ is decreasing in $m$, and thus, the fictitious tatonnement follows a stochastic process as early. The simulated distributions of aggregate actions and
returns are shown in Figure 3. The distribution of $m^*/N$ shows a faster exponential truncation for the case of $N = 1000$, compared to the case of the benchmark model. For $N = 500$, there is a small 0.2% probability for an explosive equilibrium $m^* = N$ in which all the informed traders buy. The distributions of returns are similar to the benchmark model except for the occurrence of an explosive equilibrium for the case of $N = 500$. The difference from the benchmark model arises from an altered $\phi_u$, the mean number of buying traders induced by a buying trader in tatonnement step $u$. When the traders know that there cannot be a smaller equilibrium, they can infer more precise information from the traders who receive a very high signal $x_i$. Thus, the threshold $\bar{x}(k)$ decreases in $k$ faster than in the benchmark model. This results in a different fluctuation pattern in $m$ (the left panel), but the distribution of returns (the right panel) seems to be less affected.

5.3 Discrete actions

The discreteness of the action space plays an important role in the rational herd behavior model. In our model, traders can only choose either to buy or not. Suppose instead that each trader chooses an action from a continuous action space and that the action corresponds to the private information one-to-one. Suppose that the private information is drawn from an exponential distribution, for example, and that the state space is the possible mean of the distribution, $\{1/\lambda, 1/\mu\}$, where $1/\lambda > 1/\mu$ and the true state is $1/\lambda$. Then, the likelihood ratio of observing an average information profile $\langle x \rangle$ is $(\mu/\lambda)^N e^{(\lambda-\mu)N\langle x \rangle}$. Since $\langle x \rangle \to 1/\lambda$ and $(\mu/\lambda)e^{(1-\mu/\lambda)} < 1$, the likelihood ratio converges to 0 as $N$ increases. Thus, for a large $N$, one round of information draw is sufficient for the market to learn the true state. This contrasts with our result that the amount of information revealed in equilibrium varies greatly depending on the
realization of the information profile $x$.

The aggregate effect of the binary choice shown in this model has an implication on the effectiveness of the Tobin tax scheme. The tax levied on the transactions of the assets held for short term raises the transaction costs, and thus, can suppress speculative trades. A byproduct of the increased transaction costs and the decreased trades is the inhibition of the revelation of private information. This model suggests that the inhibition may result in a larger aggregate fluctuation. An increase in transaction costs will decrease the frequency of transaction and increase the volume per transaction for each trader. In the situation where the information inferences among traders give rise to the aggregate fluctuations of volumes and returns, the magnitude of fluctuations can be suppressed by inducing the traders to trade more frequently. In the limiting case when the traders trade continuously, the stochastic fluctuations of the herd size disappear as discussed above in the case of continuous action space. This mechanism may correspond to the empirical finding by Hau [21] that the volatility of stock prices is increased by an increase in transaction costs.

The effect of the transaction costs on the aggregate fluctuations can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that traders need to trade a certain amount of assets in each year. Suppose that traders can divide the total amount into monthly transactions if the transaction cost is low, whereas they can afford only one transaction a year if the transaction cost is high. If traders tend to herd in transactions due to the revelation of private information associated with the transactions, I observe a small monthly herding when the transaction cost is low, whereas I observe a large yearly herding when the transaction cost is high. If the herd involves all the traders at once, and if the total volume traded per year is fixed at $X$, the second moment of daily volume is

---

4 Such effects were estimated by a simple numerical model by Ehrenstein et al. [15], for example.
12(X/12)^2/365 in the case of monthly herdings while it is X^2/365 in yearly herdings. Thus, while the Tobin tax does shift the occurrence of herding from the high frequency domain to low, it can result in an increase in the average daily volatility of trades.

The present model assumes a discrete state space in addition to the binary action. Even in a continuous state space, however, the structure of the information revelation will not be altered. This is because traders still form a threshold behavior, and thus, the revealed private information is lumped into two groups, below or above the threshold. The essential environment for the threshold rule, which is the necessary ingredient for the stochastic chain reaction, is that the action space is coarser than the state space so that the private information is not fully revealed by actions.

The binary state space, or the “either-or” uncertainty, arises typically when two alternative interpretations emerge among traders for a set of observations on the true value of assets. Consider the period of a prominent rise in stock prices, for example. It imposes an either-or uncertainty if the traders are divided into two camps as to whether the price rise is justifiable by fundamentals or it is a bubble. The type of stochastic herding shown in our model is plausible in this situation. After a long period of the accumulation of own private information without much revelation of the private information to the market, the average belief moves toward the level at which some traders start to trade on their private information alone even though no other traders trade. Such traders trigger the other traders to follow, and this herd size obeys the fat-tailed distribution. Thus, in the convergence process toward the true value of the asset, a bulk of adjustments is made by the tail instances of the stochastic herd. At the tail event, a number of traders become simultaneously convinced by one interpretation through the process of information revelation in which one trader’s conviction exerts a positive influence toward the conviction of another.
This paper mainly aims at explaining the fat-tailed fluctuations observed in the high-frequency domain for which the empirical evidence is most supportive. However, some empirical studies such as Jansen and de Vries [22] and Longin [28] suggest that the largest crashes and booms in the history can be understood as an extreme event within the same power-law tail, instead of being outliers. Authors such as Lee [26] and Chari and Kehoe [11] pursue to apply the logic of herd behavior to rare large events such as market crashes. Our model is consistent with their view that market crashes are caused by the same mechanism that causes price fluctuations in normal times. Of course, the uncertainty on asset fundamentals varies in terms of its impact on prices, and the underlying uncertainties for the historic crashes were probably more potent than the uncertainties that drive daily fluctuations. However, for both crashes and daily fluctuations, the traders exchange their information through the same market mechanism. Thus, low-frequency events and high-frequency events may well share the same mechanism through which the traders’ views crystallize collectively.

5.4 Information structure

In an illuminating paper, Gabaix et al. [17] provide an explanation for the power laws in stock volumes and returns by focusing on trader heterogeneity. They start from the observation that trader size follows a power law, and argue that the power law transmits to the transaction volumes and price movements even if the traders’ actions are independent. I take a different approach to explain the fat-tailed distributions by the interactions of traders who receive private information. This paper shows that the power-law distribution can emerge even if the traders are symmetric in size.

This paper employs a model of rational herding that provides an economic foundation for the traders’ apparent imitative behaviors. It has been pointed out in the
literature of critical phenomena that the imitative behaviors can lead to fat-tailed fluctuations, if the imitation occurs stochastically around a particular “critical” probability somehow. This paper provides an economic reason as to why the imitative behavior occurs at the critical probability. The basic property that warrants the imitative traders model to generate a non-degenerate, non-explosive fluctuation is that the impact of an average trader’s revealed information is $1/N$ in terms of the likelihood of another trader’s action. This property naturally arises when the private information of any trader is as worthy as another trader’s, and an action by a trader is as informative as an inaction by another.

It has been suggested that the information structure is a crucial factor that determines the nature of the distribution of the aggregate fluctuations. An important example is the standard herd behavior model with sequential trading such as Banerjee’s [5]. In such a case, a trader can only observe the actions of traders who have taken actions earlier. Then, the first trader exerts overwhelming influence on the subsequent traders, resulting in complete herding in which all traders take the same action. The standard herding model is extended to the models of critical phenomena in the market with networked traders such as Cont and Bouchaud [12] and Stauffer and Sornette [38]. They explain the power-law distributions of returns with heterogeneous or localized reference groups of traders generated by an exogenous random process. In contrast, this paper shows that stochastic herding with a power law distribution emerges in the symmetric structure of information inference among traders. The model can be extended to incorporate the heterogeneous information structure that modifies the threshold (8). The analytical method to characterize the aggregate fluctuations by the fictitious tatonnement remains valid, and the resulting distribution will be affected by the heterogeneity in the traders’ reference groups.
6 Conclusion

This paper analyzed aggregate fluctuations that arise from the information inference among traders in financial markets. In a class of herd behavior models in which each trader infers other traders’ private information only by observing their actions, I found that the number of traders who take the same action at equilibrium can exhibit a large variation. The size of the synchronized actions follows a power-law distribution with exponential truncation. The model prediction was fitted to the empirical fat-tail distribution of stock returns. The parameters that determine the power-law distribution and its exponential truncation were identified by a new analytical method that utilizes a fictitious tatonnement process. I also showed that such chain reactions are eventually triggered almost surely in the situation where private information is drawn repeatedly over time. This implies that the model features a self-organized criticality: traders’ belief must pass through the critical point at which the fluctuations of the aggregate actions follow a power law.

The power-law distribution of aggregate actions emerges when the information structure of traders is symmetric. Every trader receives private information of the same magnitude of informativeness on the true value of an asset. Thus, an action by a trader is as informative as an inaction by another. When information is revealed by a trader’s buying action, the inaction of the other traders reveals their private information in favor of not buying. This counter-revelation is facilitated by a change in the threshold private information of order $1/N$, which leads to the criticality condition for the aggregate fluctuations. Thus, the information inference model provides an economic foundation for the models of critical phenomena in the market with interacting traders.
Appendix

A Proofs

A.1 Proposition 1

By taking the log-difference of (8), I obtain

\[
\log \frac{A(\bar{x}(k))}{B(\bar{x}(k))} + \log \frac{1/p_{k+1} - 1}{1/p_k - 1} = (N-k-1) \log \frac{A(\bar{x}(k+1))}{A(\bar{x}(k))} + k \log \frac{B(\bar{x}(k+1))}{B(\bar{x}(k))} + \log \frac{\delta(\bar{x}(k+1))}{\delta(\bar{x}(k))}.
\]

Note that \( \inf(\log A - \log B) \) is strictly positive and independent of \( N \), while \( \log(1/p_{k+1} - 1) - \log(1/p_k - 1) \) converges to 0 as \( N \to \infty \), since \( S(p_k) = k/N \). Hence, the left-hand side is strictly positive for a sufficiently large \( N \). The right-hand side is strictly positive only if \( \bar{x}(k+1) < \bar{x}(k) \), since \( A' < 0 \), \( B' < 0 \), and \( \delta' < 0 \). Then, \( \bar{x}(k) \) is strictly decreasing in \( k \).

Define \( S = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, N\} \) as a set of possible equilibrium outcome \( m \), and define an aggregate reaction function \( \Gamma : S \mapsto S \) for each realization of \( x = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N) \) such that \( \Gamma(m) = D(p_m) \). Since \( \Gamma(m) \) is the number of traders with \( x_i \geq \bar{x}(m) \) for \( m = 1, 2, \ldots, N \), and since \( \Gamma(0) = \Gamma(1) \), a decreasing \( \bar{x} \) implies that \( \Gamma \) is non-decreasing in \( m \) for any realization of \( x \). Since \( \Gamma \) is a non-decreasing mapping of a finite discrete set \( S \) onto itself, there exists a non-empty closed set of fixed points of \( \Gamma \) by Tarski’s fixed point theorem.

A.2 Lemma 1

Applying Vives [40], it is directly shown that this tatonnement always reaches a fixed point \( m_T \) of \( \Gamma \), since \( \Gamma \) is increasing, \( S \) is finite, and \( m_0 = 0 \) is the minimum in \( S \).
Further, \( m_T \) must coincide with the minimum fixed point \( m^* \) for the following reason. Suppose that there exists another fixed point \( m \) that is strictly smaller than \( m_T \). Then I can pick \( u < T \) such that \( m_u < m < m_{u+1} \). Applying the non-decreasing function \( \Gamma \), I obtain \( \Gamma(m_u) \leq \Gamma(m) \). Then, \( m_{u+1} \leq m \). This contradicts \( m < m_{u+1} \).

### A.3 Lemma 3

Equation (22) implies that \( \bar{x}(k) - \bar{x}(k+1) \) is of order \( 1/N \), by which I mean \( O(1/N) \), namely that the term multiplied by \( N \) converges to a non-zero constant as \( N \to \infty \). From Equation (9), I obtain that \( q_u = (f(\bar{x}_{u-1})/F(\bar{x}_{u-1}))(\bar{x}(m_{u-1}) - \bar{x}(m_u)) + O(1/N^2) \).

Thus, \( q_u \) is also of order \( 1/N \). The asymptotic mean of the binomial variable \( m_{u+1} - m_u \) conditional on \( m_u - m_{u-1} = 1 \) is derived as follows:

\[
\phi_u \equiv \lim_{N \to \infty} q_u|_{m_u-m_{u-1}=1}(N-m_u)
\]

\[
= \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{f(\bar{x}_{u-1})}{F(\bar{x}_{u-1})} \frac{\log A(\bar{x}_{u-1}) - \log B(\bar{x}_{u-1})}{N} \frac{-(N-m_u)}{N} \tag{23}
\]

\[
= \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{N-m_u}{N} \left( \frac{\log A(\bar{x}_{u-1}) - \log B(\bar{x}_{u-1})}{N} \frac{-(N-m_u)}{N} \right) \tag{24}
\]

where I used (22) and the fact that the difference of \( \log p_k \) is of order \( 1/N \) for the second equation and (5) and (6) for the third equation. Note that \( m_u/N \) converges to \( 1 - F(\bar{x}_{u-1}) \) with probability 1 for a fixed threshold \( \bar{x}_{u-1} \) as \( N \to \infty \) by the strong law of large numbers. Then, \( (m_u/(N-m_u))(F(\bar{x}_{u-1})/(1 - F(\bar{x}_{u-1}))) \) converges to 1 with probability 1. Applying this to (24), I obtain the expression (10). Using that \( \bar{x}(m_u) - \bar{x}(m_{u-1}) \) is of order \( 1/N \), I obtain that \( q_u(N-m_u) \to \phi_u(m_u - m_{u-1}) \) for \( N \to \infty \). Hence, \( m_{u+1} - m_u \) asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution with mean \( \phi_u(m_u - m_{u-1}) \), which is equivalently a \( (m_u - m_{u-1}) \)-fold convolution of a Poisson distribution with mean \( \phi_u \). Thus, the binomial process asymptotically follows a branching
process in which each parent bears a random number of children that follows a Poisson distribution with mean \( \phi_u \).

A.4 Proposition 2

Define \( A_N, B_N \), and \( \phi_u^N \) similarly as in the previous section by using \( G_N \) and \( F \). Then, \( A_N(\bar{x})/B_N(\bar{x}) \to 1 \) holds since \( A_N/B_N = (1/F - 1)/(1/G_N - 1) \). As the term \( A/B \) tends to 1, the first fraction in the right-hand side of (10) converges to 1 because of \( A > \delta > B \), and the second fraction also converges to 1 by l'Hospital's rule. Then, \( \phi_u^N \to 1 \) obtains as \( N \to \infty \).

Thus, the binomial process \( m_{u+1} - m_u \) asymptotically follows a branching process with a Poisson random variable with mean 1. Therefore, given \( m_1 = l \), Theorem 1 applies with \( \phi = 1 \) for the conditional distribution of the sum of the branching process, \( m^* \).

A.5 Proposition 3

I show that \( m_1 \) asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution with some constant mean \( \mu \) as the number of traders \( N \) increases to infinity. Let \( \bar{x}_N^1 \) denote the threshold for traders to buy when there is no other trader buying in the economy with \( N \) traders. Using the exponential specification, the logarithm of Equation (7) that determines \( \bar{x}_N^1 \) is rewritten as:

\[
\left( \frac{1/p_1 - 1}{\theta_0} \right) / \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\lambda \log N} \right) = \left( 1 + \frac{1 - e^{-\lambda \bar{x}_N^1}}{e^{\lambda \bar{x}_N^1} - 1} \right)^{N-1} e^{-\bar{x}_N^1 \log N} \quad (25)
\]

Now define \( R_N = \frac{1 - e^{-\lambda \bar{x}_N^1}}{e^{\lambda \bar{x}_N^1} - 1} \). The first component of the right-hand side \((1 + R_N)^{N-1}\) converges to a constant if \( R_N \) declines as \( 1/N \). I guess that \( \bar{x}_N^1 / \log N \) converges to
constant $a$. If $a < 1/\lambda$, $R_N$ declines slower than $1/N$. Thus, $(1 + R_N)^{N-1}$ diverges to infinity. Since the second component $e^{-\frac{x_N^1}{\log N}}$ converges to a constant, the right-hand side of (25) diverges. Thus, this $x_N^1$ cannot solve (25). If $a > 1/\lambda$, $R_N$ declines faster than $1/N$. Thus, $(1 + R_N)^N - 1$ converges to 1. The second component converges to a constant. Noting that $p_1$ converges to $p_0$ as $N \to \infty$, (25) is solved at the limit of $N$ if $a$ satisfies $(1/p_0 - 1)/\theta_0 = e^{-a}$. This is possible when $-\log((1/p_0 - 1)/\theta_0) > 1/\lambda$.

Finally, consider the case $a = 1/\lambda$. I write $x_N^1$ as $\log N/\lambda + \epsilon_N$. Then, (25) at the limit becomes $\log((1/p_0 - 1)/\theta_0) + 1/\lambda = (1 - e^{-1/\lambda})/e^{\lim_{N \to \infty} \lambda \epsilon_N}$. Thus, $x_N^1 = \log N/\lambda + \epsilon_N$ holds when $-\log((1/p_0 - 1)/\theta_0) < 1/\lambda$ and $\epsilon_N$ converges to constant $\epsilon$.

The asymptotic mean of $m_1$ is defined as $\mu \equiv \lim_{N \to \infty} N e^{-\lambda x_N^1}$. For $x_N^1 = \log N/\lambda + \epsilon_N$, I obtain that $\mu = e^{-\lambda \epsilon} > 0$. Equation (13) is derived by mixing the Borel-Tanner distribution when $\phi = 1$ and the Poisson distribution with mean $\mu$. (For the explicit derivation of (13), see Nirei [33].) Finally, (14) is obtained by applying Stirling’s formula.

A.6 Proposition 4

I define the threshold function $\bar{x}_t(P_{k,t}, x_i^{t-1})$ at which trader $i$ is indifferent between buying and not buying. It is implicitly determined by

$$\frac{1}{p_t} - 1 = P_{k,t} \theta_0 \delta(\bar{x}_t) \prod_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \delta(x_{i,\tau}).$$

(26)

It follows that $\delta(\bar{x}_t(P_{k,t}, x_i^{t-1})) \prod_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \delta(x_{i,\tau})$ is equal to $(1/p_t - 1)/(\theta_0 P_{k,t})$, and thus, is constant across $i$ in group $k$. Then, $A_{k,t} > (1/p_t - 1)/(\theta_0 P_{k,t}) > B_{k,t}$ can be shown as
follows. The numerator of \( A_{k,t} \) is expanded as

\[
\int_{X_{k,1}} \cdots \int_{X_{k,t-1}} G(\bar{x}_t(P_{k,t}, x_{i,t}^{t-1})) \delta(x_{i,t-1}) dF(x_{i,t-1}) \cdots \delta(x_{i,1}) dF(x_{i,1}) 
\]

(27)

\[
> \int_{X_{k,1}} \cdots \int_{X_{k,t-1}} F(\bar{x}_t(P_{k,t}, x_{i,t}^{t-1})) \delta(\bar{x}_t(P_{k,t}, x_{i,t}^{t-1})) \Pi_{\tau=1}^{t-1} (\delta(x_{i,\tau}) dF(x_{i,\tau}))
\]

(28)

\[
= \frac{1}{p_t - 1} \int_{X_{k,1}} \cdots \int_{X_{k,t-1}} F(\bar{x}_t(P_{k,t}, x_{i,t}^{t-1})) dF(x_{i,t-1}) \cdots dF(x_{i,1}).
\]

(29)

The integral in (29) is equal to the denominator of \( A_{k,t} \), and thus, \( A_{k,t} > (1/p_t - 1)/(\theta_0 P_{k,t}) \) holds. Similarly, I obtain \( B_{k,t} < (1/p_t - 1)/(\theta_0 P_{k,t}) \).

Suppose that \( m_t \) increases due to an increase in \( m_{k,t} \). \( P_{k,t} \) decreases by \( A_{k,t} > B_{k,t} \) and (17). Then, \( \bar{x}_t \) needs to adjust in order to satisfy (26). By using \( A_{k,t} > (1/p_t - 1)/(\theta_0 P_{k,t}) > B_{k,t} \), I get that the logarithms of \( A_{k,t} \) and \( B_{k,t} \) are decreasing in \( \bar{x}_t \) as in the static model. Further, \( \delta(\bar{x}_t) \) is decreasing in \( \bar{x}_t \). Thus, \( \bar{x}_t \) in (26) decreases in response to the increase in \( m_t \). The decreasing \( \bar{x}_t \) entails a non-decreasing reaction function of \( m_{t+1} \) defined for each realization of \( x^t \). Hence, the existence of an equilibrium is established by Tarski’s fixed point theorem. This completes the proof.

The informational tatonnement process is characterized by a set of binomial distributions with probability \( q_{k,u} \) and population \( n_k \). When \( m_k \) and \( \bar{x}_u - \bar{x}_{u+1} \) are small and \( n_k \) is large, the binomial allows a Poisson approximation. Thus, the sum of traders who buy in step \( u \) is approximated by a Poisson with mean \( \sum_k n_k q_{k,u} \). Hence, the tatonnement approximately follows a Poisson branching process.

A.7 Proposition 5

The likelihood ratio for the private information history, \( \prod_{\tau=1}^t \delta(x_{i,\tau}) \), converges to zero as in Billingsley [7]. The proof is outlined as follows. The likelihood ratio \( \theta_{i,t} \) follows a martingale in the probability measure of the private information under the
true state: $E(\theta_{i,t} \mid \theta_{i,t-1}, H) = \theta_{i,t-1}$. Further, the likelihood ratio is bounded from below at zero by construction. Then, the martingale convergence theorem asserts that the likelihood ratio converges in distribution to a random variable. Moreover, the probability measures represented by the distributions $F^T$ and $G^T$ for a sequence of private information $(x_{i,1}, x_{i,2}, \ldots, x_{i,T})$ are mutually singular when $T \to \infty$, since $x_{i,t}$ is independent across $t$. Then, $\prod_{\tau=1}^t \delta_{i,\tau}$ converges to zero.

Hence, $\theta_{i,t}$ converges to zero if $P_{k,t}$ remains finite for $t \to \infty$. $P_{k,t}$ is finite for a finite $\bar{x}_t$ when $N$ is finite. When $\bar{x}_t$ tends to a positive infinity, $P_{k,t}$ decreases to a finite value since $A_{k,t}$ and $B_{k,t}$ are decreasing in $\bar{x}_t$ and positive. When $\bar{x}_t$ tends to a negative infinity, all traders eventually choose to buy. Hence, $\prod_h A_{h,t}^{mh,t}$ tends to one, and $P_{k,t}$ tends to $\prod_h B_{h,t}^{mh,t} / B_{k,t}$. I showed that $B_{k,t} < (1/p_t - 1) / (\theta_0 P_{k,t})$ in the proof of Proposition 4. If $P_{k,t}$ tends to a positive infinity as $\bar{x}_t$ tends to a negative infinity, then, this inequality contradicts the fact that $P_{k,t}$ tends to $\prod_h B_{h,t}^{mh,t} / B_{k,t}$ for any finite $N$. Thus, $P_{k,t}$ is finite as $t \to \infty$. Hence, $\theta_{i,t}$ is dominated by private information as $t \to \infty$ and converges to zero, and $b_{i,t}$ converges to 1 almost surely.

References


